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INTRODUCTION

The majority of commerical law cases decided during the Survey
* Associate, Altheimer & Gray; B.A., 1978, University of Illinois; J.D., 1981, Boston
University.
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year did not establish new doctrines of law, but instead clarified or
expanded previously established principles. This article reviews
Survey year cases concerning business associations, 1 securities regulations,2 commercial transactions,3 contracts,4 products liability,5
and consumer protection. 6 Additionally, legislation passed during
the Survey year, including the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act,7 amendments to the Business Corporation Act of 1983,8
securities regulations, 9 and amendments to the Illinois Bank Hold
Company, 10 is discussed.
II.

BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS

A. Agency
In Bachewicz v. American National Bank," the court reaffirmed,
in dicta, the long-standing principle that a co-owner of real estate
attempting to sell the entire property must comply with the Statute
of Frauds. Pursuant to the Statute of Frauds, a co-owner attempting to sell property must document the co-owner's authority to sell
in a writing signed by the other co-owner.' 2
In Bachewicz, two partnerships, Associates and Statesman, coowned property.' 3 The defendant, American National Bank, held
legal title to the property as trustee of an Illinois land trust. The
dispute arose after Associates and Statesman agreed to operate a
building on the property as a joint venture. The joint venture
agreement contained a deadlock provision14 that would become ef1. See infra notes 11-137 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 138-181 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 182-286 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 287-394 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 395-440 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 441-444 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 445-548 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 549-595 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 596-668 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 669-718 and accompanying text.
11. 111 Ill. 2d 444, 490 N.E.2d 680 (1986).
12. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 59, para. 2 (1983).
13. Bachewicz, 111 Ill. 2d at 446, 490 N.E.2d at 681. See also infra notes 64-66.
14. Bachewicz, 111 111. 2d at 446, 490 N.E.2d at 681. A deadlock provision operates
when parties fail to reach agreement upon a matter. Id. In Bachewicz, the provision
became operative only when it was clear that one party wanted to sell the property and
the other party did not. The deadlock provision stated:
In the event an offer is received for the purchase of the entire apartment building, and the parties cannot agree whether to accept said offer, the party who
desires to accept said offer shall so advise the other party in writing. Thereafter,
said other party shall have thirty (30) days within which to either consent to the
sale as proposed by such third party or may, within said thirty (30) day period,
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fective only if a third party offered to purchase the property.
Under the deadlock provision, when the co-owners disagreed about
whether to sell, a co-owner's consent to sell was presumed if he
failed to buy out the other co-owner's interest in the property.
The plaintiff, B & B Investment Co., offered to purchase the
property from Associates and Statesman. Both co-owners rejected
this offer. Subsequently, B & B tendered a second offer to Associates. Associates accepted this offer conditioned upon Statesman's
consent to the sale. Statesman neither accepted B & B's offer nor
purchased Associates's interest in the property. Nonetheless, B &
B continued in its efforts to purchase the property, and claimed
that the parties formed a contract for the sale of property. Associates and Statesman, however, denied that a valid contract existed.
Subsequently, Statesman acquired Associates's interest in the property and sold the building to a third party. B & B responded by
instituting an action for specific performance of the contract,
claiming that the deadlock provision vested Associates with the authority to accept the1 5offer for Statesman, thereby creating a valid
sale of the property.
The trial court dismissed B & B's specific performance complaint. The appellate court reversed and remanded, noting that an
action for damages could be sustained.' 6 On remand, the trial
court awarded B & B damages based upon its finding that an enforceable, valid contract existed.
The appellate court affirmed, but
7
modified the damage award.'
The supreme court asserted that a timely application of the
deadlock provision could authorize Associates to bind Statesman
to the sale. 8 The court, however, held that no agency relationship
existed because Statesman did not have an opportunity to reject the
second offer.19 The court reasoned that Statesman could not be
bound by Associates's acceptance because B & B had attempted to
elect in writing to purchase the interest of the party desiring to sell for an
amount equal to the proportionate share of the offer which would have been
received by the party, desiring to sell its interest in the apartment building.
Failure to make an election within the thirty (30) day period shall be deemed to
be a consent to such proposed sale, and the parties shall thereafter proceed to
consummate such sale, and both parties agree to execute all necessary documents to complete such sale.
Id. at 448, 490 N.E.2d at 682.
15. Id. at 446-447, 490 N.E.2d at 681.
16. Id. at 447, 490 N.E.2d at 681.
17. Bachewicz v. American National Bank, 126 I11.
App. 3d 298, 466 N.E.2d 1096
(1st Dist.1984), rev'd, 111 Ill. 2d 444, 490 N.E.2d 680 (1986).
18. Bachewicz, 111I11. 2d 444, 490 N.E.2d 680.
19. Id.
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invoke the deadlock provision prematurely. 20 The deadlock provision could be invoked only if Statesman rejected B & B's second
offer before Associates's conditional acceptance. Bachewicz thus
illustrates that an agency relationship can be created pursuant to a
timely invocation of a deadlock provision assuming the agreement
satisfies the Statute of Frauds.21
Three Illinois appellate courts also confronted significant aspects
of agency law during the Survey year. In Kouba v. East Joliet
Bank,2 2 the Illinois Appellate Court for the Third District suggested a new development in agency law. In two decisions, the
Illinois Appellate Court for the Third District reiterated axiomatic
principles of agency and applied them to new fact patterns.
The issue raised in Kouba was whether section 9-507 of the Uni23
form Commercial Code (the "U.C.C."),
which governs remedies,
applies to secured parties when an independent contractor is
charged with committing a breach of peace in violation of section
9-503 of the U.C.C. 24 In Kouba, defendant East Joliet Bank, held a
security interest in a truck purchased by the plaintiffs, Walter and
Acelia Kouba. When the plaintiffs defaulted on their monthly loan
payments, the bank contracted with Leroy Campbell to repossess
the truck. Defendants Mau, Sullivan, and Schroll, who were hired
by Campbell, went to the plaintiffs' residence to recover the truck.
Subsequently, Mau grabbed Acelia Kouba by the neck, threw her
to the ground and took the truck by force. 25 The police arrived
shortly after the repossessors set the truck on fire and dropped it
off a truck hoist. A subsequent fire at defendant Keister's garage
destroyed the vehicle.26
The plaintiffs appealed an order of summary judgment entered
in favor of defendants East Joliet Bank and Dave Keister, owner of
Keister's Garage.27 Three issues were decided on appeal.28 First,
20. Id.
21. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 59, para. 2 (1983).
22. 135 I11.App. 3d 264, 481 N.E.2d 325 (3rd Dist.1985).
23. ILL. REV. STAT. ch.26, para. 9-507 (1983).
24. Kouba, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 264, 481 N.E.2d at 325 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26,
para. 9-503 (1985)). Paragraph 9-503 provides that "[u]nless otherwise agreed a secured
party has on default the right to take possession of the collateral. In taking possession a
secured party may proceed without judicial process if this can be done without breach of
the peace or may proceed by action ..
" ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, para. 9-503 (1985).
25. Id. at 265, 481 N.E.2d at 327.
26. Id.
27. Id. Defendants Sullivan and Schroll had never been found for service of summons and were dismissed by plaintiffs. A default judgment was entered against defendants Mau and Campbell. Id.
28. Id.
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the court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the bank be2
cause the holding did not contradict the intent of the U.C.C.. 9
The bank contended that, as a matter of law, it was relieved of all
30
liability because the repossessors were independent contractors.
In contrast, the plaintiffs asserted that the bank was statutorily liable pursuant to Article 9 of the U.C.C. 31 and that common law
agency principles should have been ignored.32 The court refused to
accept the plaintiffs' argument and held that because the plaintiffs
had failed to specifically plead a statutory remedy under section 9507 of the U.C.C., only the common law remedies for wrongful
repossession were available. 33 Accordingly, the court did not decide the issue of whether section 9-507 applies to secured parties
when an independent contractor, rather than an employee, is
charged with committing a breach of peace in violation of section
34
9-503 of the U.C.C..
The court found no issue of fact regarding the bank's vicarious
liability for the tortious conduct of the repossessors because the
repossessors were independent contractors. 35 Finally, the court
held that the plaintiffs had a cause of action against Dave Keister
and Keister's Garage as third-party beneficiaries of the bailment
contract between the bank and Keister.36
29. Id.
30. Id. at 266, 481 N.E.2d at 327.
31. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, paras. 9-101, 9-507 (1985).
32. Kouba, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 266, 481 N.E. 2d at 327. Under the plaintiffs' theory,
section 9-503 permitted the bank to take possession of the truck following default without
judicial process if repossession could be accomplished without a breach of peace. In
Kouba, there was no dispute that the repossessors hired by the bank caused a breach of
peace. Id. Thus, the plaintiffs had a remedy in section 9-507, which has been construed
as granting statutory relief for any violation of Article 9, part 5. See also WHITE AND
SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 26-14 (2d ed. 1985).
33. Kouba, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 266, 481 N.E.2d at 328 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26,
para. 9-507 (1985)). If the collateral is consumer goods, the debtor may recover the
credit service charge plus 10% of the principal amount of the debt, and 10% of the cash
price. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, para. 9-507 (1985). The secured party also can be denied
a deficiency judgment. Id. The common law remedies would be available only after a
determination of whether the bank was responsible under the law of agency for the acts of
the repossessors. Kouba, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 266, 481 N.E.2d at 328. The bank's responsibility depends on whether the court found the repossessors to be independent contractors. Id.
34. Kouba, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 266, 481 N.E.2d at 328.
35. Kouba, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 267, 481 N.E.2d at 328. The court then concluded
that the bank could not be liable for the repossessors actions because the repossessors
were independent contractors. Finding no genuine issue of fact regarding the bank's liability, the court affirmed the order of summary judgment entered in favor of the bank.
Id.
36. Id. at 268, 481 N.E.2d at 329. The Kouba court also noted that the plaintiffs had
failed to establish an exception to the general rule insulating an employer from liability
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In a dissenting opinion, 37 Justice Stouder argued that, under section 9-503,38 the bank was liable for the damages to the truck by
virtue of the wrongful nature of the repossession. 9 Justice Stouder
stated that plaintiffs' failure to specifically plead a remedy under
section 9-507 of the U.C.C. ° should not preclude relief under the
section.41 According to Justice Stouder, the inappropriateness of
the remedy should not have affected the bank's liability. 42 He argued that the majority should have relied upon principles of law
and equity to supplement the provisions of the U.C.C. rather than
on the common law theory of agency.43
The Illinois Appellate Court for the First District decided two
other agency cases during the Survey year. In Advance Mortgage v.
Concordia," the court reiterated a well-established axiom of
agency: a principal conferring an agent with the express authority
to perform a duty implicitly authorizes the agent to perform other
acts necessary to effectuate that duty. 5
The plaintiff, Advance Mortgage ("Advance"), entered into a
Purchase and Service Agreement46 with the defendant Concordia,
whereby Advance agreed to sell Concordia certain mortgages.
Under the agreement, Advance was required to collect all payfor the acts of an independent contractor. There was no allegation that the bank had
negligently hired the repossessors or directed the tortious act. Id. at 267, 481 N.E.2d at
328. Finally, the court considered whether defendant Keister was entitled to summary
judgment concerning the allegation that he was negligent in failing to take reasonable
care of the truck. The court held that the plaintiffs pleaded a valid claim against Keister,
thereby reversing the circuit court dismissal and remanding the issue for further consideration. The Kouba court relied on the principle that a debtor should have a right of action
against a third party who damages the collateral following default and repossession to the
extent of the debtor's property or insurable interest in the collateral. The court indicated
that a debtor's rights and responsibilities with regard to collateral after default permitted
a debtor to maintain an action against a third party who negligently damaged the collateral after default and repossession by the secured party. The Kouba court thus held that
the plaintiffs were entitled to maintain their cause of action against Keister. Id. at 269,
481 N.E.2d at 329-30.
37. Kouba, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 270, 481 N.E.2d at 330 (Stouder, J., dissenting).
38. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, para. 9-503 (1985).
39. Kouba, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 270, 481 N.E.2d at 330 (Stouder, J., dissenting).
40. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, para. 9-507 (1985).
41. Kouba, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 270, 481 N.E.2d at 330 (Stouder, J., dissenting). Section 9-507 is available "if it is established that the secured party is not proceeding in
accordance with the provisions of this Part [part 5]." Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, para. 1-103 (1985)). Paragraph 1-103 provides
that "unless displaced by the particular provision of the Act, the principles of law and
equity shall supplement the provisions." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, para. 1-103 (1985).
44. 135 Ill. App. 3d 477, 481 N.E.2d 1025 (1st Dist. 1985).
45. Id. at 481, 481 N.E.2d 1029.
46. Id. at 479, 481 N.E.2d 1027.
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ments due, make diligent efforts to insure the mortgaged premises,
and pay any corresponding taxes." When the mortgagor defaulted, Advance withdrew its own funds to pay taxes and insurance premiums on the mortgaged premises. An escrow overdraft
resulted. Subsequently, Concordia instituted foreclosure proceedings and submitted its payoff letter into the closing escrow without
including a demand for those funds paid by Advance. The Circuit
Court of Cook County granted Advance's motion for summary
judgment in an action for reimbursement of the funds it paid for
taxes and insurance.48
In affirming the circuit court ruling, the appellate court reasoned
that the agency relationship between Advance and Concordia gave
Advance the implied authority to employ any legal means necessary to effectuate the act it was expressly authorized to perform. 49
Accordingly, Advance had the authority to choose the manner in
which it caused the mortgaged premises to be insured and the taxes
to be paid. 0
The second significant agency case decided by the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District during the Survey period also expounded axiomatic principles of agency law. In Tripi v. Landon,5
the court awarded the plaintiff damages based upon the agency relationship between the defendant and his employee. 2 The parties
in Tripi had been conducting business with each other for nine
years. During this time, plaintiff Tripi was unaware that he was
conducting business with a corporation, because defendant Landon
did not purport to be anything other than an individual. 3 When
Landon moved his business, he told Tripi that Landon's orders
would be placed by Earl Gabrielson. Within two months, Tripi
sent invoices and three sets of goods ordered by Gabrielson to Landon's new place of business. Landon refused to pay the bills and
failed to attend a meeting he scheduled with Tripi for the purpose
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 482, 481 N.E.2d at 1024. In construing the agreement, the court also dismissed the idea that Advance was a mere stranger or volunteer. The court further noted
that even assuming that Advance acted outside of its authority, the circuit court judgment would be affirmed on the theory that Concordia's retention of the benefit of Advance's actions constituted a ratification. Id. at 483-84, 481 N.E.2d at 1030-31.
50. Id. at 482, 481 N.E.2d at 1029.
51. 140 Ill. App. 3d 230, 488 N.E.2d 610 (1st Dist. 1986).
52. Id. at 235, 488 N.E.2d at 613.
53. Id. at 231-32, 488 N.E.2d at 611. Landon was officer and director of F. Landon
Cartage Company, F. Landon Trucking Company, Landon Truck Leasing Company,
and Landon Truck Leasing Limited. Id.
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of discussing the unpaid bills. Tripi then filed an action to recover
the cost of goods sold. At trial, Landon admitted that he occasionally gave Gabrielson a check to buy parts, but denied the existThe trial court awarded Tripi the
ence of an agency relationship.
4
cost of goods sold.1

On appeal, Landon argued that the trial court had incorrectly
found him liable under an alter ego theory of liability." The appellate court, however, stated that Landon had misconstrued the trial
court's finding. 6 The reviewing court noted that the trial court
had not considered Landon's liability under a corporate alter ego
theory, but instead had found him liable under the common law
theory of agency." Because Landon conducted his business with
Tripi as an individual and not as a corporation,58 the appellate
court reasoned that Landon could not have been liable upon an
"alter ego" theory of liability. 9 Thus, because the trial court
clearly had resolved the agency issue by finding the existence of a
principal-agent relationship between Landon and Gabrielson, 60 the
appellate court affirmed the award of the cost of goods sold. 61
B.

Partnerships

The Illinois Supreme Court decided only one case concerning
partnership law during the Survey period, 62 although several partnership issues were resolved at the appellate level.63 In Bachewicz
v. American NationalBank,64 the supreme court held that one coowner's acceptance of an offer to sell did not bind the other coowner to the sale. 65 The Bachewicz court thus reaffirmed that partnership principles govern joint ventures because joint ventures are
54. Id. at 231, 488 N.E.2d at 611. The amount of the award was $4,057.22. Id.
55. Id. at 234, 488 N.E.2d at 613.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 235, 488 N.E.2d at 613. Landon originally argued that the agency action
should have been barred by the Statute of Frauds. Landon, however, omitted any mention of the Statute of Frauds in his answer to Tripi's second amended complaint. Thus,
because no subsequent attempt was made to raise the Statute of Frauds defense in the
trial court, the issue was waived. Id. at 233, 488 N.E.2d at 612.
61. Id. at 235, 488 N.E.2d at 613.
62. See infra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
63. See infra notes 67-89.
64. 111 I1I. 2d 444, 490 N.E.2d 680 (1986). For a recitation of the facts and a discussion of the agency issues in Bachewicz, see supra notes 13-21 and accompanying text.
65. Bachewicz, 111 Ill. 2d at 448, 490 N.E.2d at 682.
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essentially partnerships conducted for a single enterprise.66
Several appellate court decisions considered issues of partnership
law.67 In Ellerby v. Speizer,68 the Illinois Appellate Court for the
Second District considered the distribution of profits from contingent fee cases pending at the time a law partnership was dissolved.
The court held that, absent a provision in the oral partnership
agreement pertaining to the distribution of such profits, the Uniform Partnership Act controlled profit distributions.69 In Ellerby,
plaintiff Ellerby, and defendants Speizer and Thorsen formed a law
partnership by oral agreement. Years later, following the dissolution of the partnership, the parties disagreed about distribution of
post-dissolution profits from contingent fee cases. Ellerby filed a
motion alleging an improper distribution of profits. The trial court
ruled that the profits were to be distributed in conformity with a
detailed schedule set forth by the trial court.7°
Ellerby appealed the order for distribution of profits, 7' contending it was inconsistent with the terms of the oral partnership agreement. 2 Speizer cross-appealed, advancing a similar argument.73
Speizer first claimed that the attorney for a particular case was
entitled to the total fee less the value of services rendered prior to
dissolution. Speizer also contended that the Uniform Partnership
Act 74 permitted compensation for work performed by a partner in

the partnership's business.75
Relying on the Uniform Partnership Act,76 the appellate court
66. Id. at 454, 490 N.E.2d at 685.
67. One partnership case arose from the Second District during the Survey period.
The dispute in Gromer, Wittenstrom & Meyer v. Strom, 140 Ill. App. 3d 349, 489 N.E.2d
370 (2d Dist. 1986), surfaced after the dissolution of a law partnership between Wittenstrom, Meyer and the defendant, Strom. Following the dissolution, Wittenstrom and
Meyer became sole shareholders of the plaintiff corporation. In affirmatively ruling on a
motion to vacate a confession judgment, the Illinois Appellate Court for the Second District refused to recognize the corporation as an entity separate from its shareholders. The
court reasoned that the separate recognition would result in sanctioning an action that
could otherwise not be maintained by the shareholders individually. Id.
68. 138 Ill. App. 3d 77, 485 N.E.2d 413 (2nd Dist. 1985).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 79, 485 N.E.2d at 415.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 80, 485 N.E.2d at 415. The Ellerby court refused to consider the contention that the trial court's distribution of profits was inconsistent with the terms of the oral
partnership agreement. Instead, the court held that Speizer failed to plead the inconsistent distribution in his answer and therefore effected a waiver of that claim. Id.
74. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1061A, para. 18 (1985).
75. Ellerby, 138 Ill. App. 3d at 79, 485 N.E.2d at 415.
76. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1061A, para. 31(b) (1985).
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reasoned that either unilateral action or mutual consent of the parties could properly and effectively dissolve the partnership because
there was no provision in the oral partnership agreement pertaining to dissolution." The court further stated that the partnership
did not terminate upon dissolution. The court concluded that the
parties remained partners until the completion of all of their partnership affairs,7 8 including the winding up of pending cases handled on a contingent fee basis.79 Therefore, the Ellerby court held
that fees from the pending cases constituted assets of the partnership. This necessitated that their distribution be in conformity
with the provisions of the Uniform Partnership Act. °
Next, the court addressed Speizer's cross-appeal. Speizer
claimed a right to entire fees from cases he was handling less a
partnership claim for the reasonable value of services rendered
prior to dissolution. The court denied that claim.8 1 The court

commented that Speizer had a duty to complete unfinished business.82 Thus, the court rejected Speizer's alternative contention
that certain clients discharged the partnership and hired Speizer
individually. 3 Additionally, the court ruled that completing the
pending cases did not entitle a partner to compensation for working on them. 4 Instead, each partner was entitled to a reimbursement for any reasonable and necessary overhead expenses
attributable to winding up the partnership's business.8 " Therefore,
the court deemed the trial court's distribution of profits erroneous,
reversed the lower court's ruling, and remanded the cause to be
77. Ellerby, 138 Ill. App. 3d at 80, 485 N.E.2d at 416.
78. Id. at 81, 485 N.E.2d at 416 (citing Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman v. Cohen, 146
Cal. App. 3d 200, 217, 194 Cal. Rptr. 180, 190 (1983)).
79. Ellerby, 138 Ill. App. 3d at 81, 485 N.E.2d at 416.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 81-82, 485 N.E.2d at 416-17.
82. Id. at 81, 445 N.E.2d at 416 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1061/2, paras. 30, 33,
35(l)(a) (1985)).
83. Ellerby, 138 Ill. App. 3d at 81-82, 485 N.E.2d at 416-17. The court also noted
that allowing a partner compensation for completing pending cases would encourage
case-chasing by attorneys in partnerships pending dissolution. Id.
84. Id. at 82, 485 N.E.2d at 417 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1061/2, para. 18(f)
(1985)). Paragraph 18(f) provides: "[N]o partner is entitled to remuneration for acting in
the partnership business." The Ellerby court noted that the one exception to the provision of 18(f), to allow reasonable compensation for the services of a surviving partner
winding up the affairs of a partnership dissolved by the death of a partner, did not apply
to the instant case. Id.
85. Id. at 83, 485 N.E.2d at 417. Furthermore, the formula in effect at the time of
dissolution remained in effect and bonuses were provided because Speizer had waived
introducing evidence of the oral agreement. Id. at 83, 485 N.E.2d at 418.
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decided in accordance with the Uniform Partnership Act. 6
One final appellate court decision, Hofner v. Glenn Ingram &
Co.,87 bears upon a procedural aspect of partnership law. In
Hofner, the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District held that
section 2-1008 of the Code of Civil Procedure indicates that a partnership's general appearance is distinguishable from each partner's
individual appearance, although the law does not recognize a partnership as an entity apart from the partners.88 The Hofner court
ruled that a plaintiff filing a claim against an individual partner
must seek leave to amend his complaint if the original complaint
names only the partnership as the defendant.8 9
C. Corporations
The Illinois Supreme Court ruled on only one significant case
involving corporation law during the Survey period. 90 Because that
case was a taxpayer action, it is more appropriately discussed in
the State and Local Government section of this Survey. At the
86. Id. at 84, 485 N.E.2d at 418 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1061/2, para. 40(b)
(1985)).
87. 140 I1l. App. 3d 874, 489 N.E.2d 311 (1st Dist. 1985).
88. Id. at 885, 489 N.E.2d at 318 (citing 1 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW
OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 20 (rev. perm. ed. 1983)).
89. Hofner, 140 Ill. App. 3d at 885, 489 N.E.2d at 318. In Horner, the plaintiff, a
certified public accountant, signed a partnership agreement and became a partner of the
defendant accounting firm. Partners' salaries were based on estimated future earnings for
the subsequent fiscal year and were paid in twelve allotments. Subsequently, the plaintiff
expressed doubt regarding the firm's ability to make the earnings projected for the following fiscal year and told a senior partner that he would resign if he could not earn his
$40,000 projected salary. The plaintiff alleged that the senior partner then orally assured
him he would receive a minimum salary of $40,000. The firm failed to meet its projected
earnings, but the plaintiff was still reassured of his salary and no other partners expressly
or implicitly rescinded the proposed minimum income. When the plaintiff resigned, the
same senior partner assured him that his remaining salary due would be based on the
$40,000 figure. When plaintiff later requested the balance of his yearly income, the defendant firm denied that he was entitled to the allegedly promised $40,000 yearly salary.
The suit followed. The trial court found that the plaintiff was bound to the partnership
agreement and dismissed his complaint for failure to state a cause of action. The plaintiff
appealed. On appeal, the court applied common law theories of agency and partnership
and concluded that the trial court had erred in dismissing the complaint. Hofner, 140 Ill.
App. 3d 874, 489 N.E.2d 311.
90. Feen v. Ray, 109 Ill. 2d 339, 487 N.E.2d 619 (1985). The court in Feen elucidated that both taxpayer actions and corporate shareholder suits are based on two causes
of action. For the taxpayer suit, one action lies against public officials for failing to sue
and the other lies against the alleged wrongdoer based upon the cause of action belonging
to the governmental body. Similarly, for the corporate shareholder suit, one action lies
against the corporate director for failing to sue and the other lies against the alleged
wrongdoer based upon the cause of action belonging to the corporation. In both types of
derivative suits the court noted the corporation or the governmental body is a necessary
party because recovery runs in favor of it. Id.
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appellate court level, two fiduciary duty cases and one trade secret
case illustrate developments in corporation law during the Survey
period.
In Callier v. Callier,91 the Illinois Appellate Court for the Fifth
District analyzed the fiduciary duties of shareholders in close corporations. The Callier court held that a fifty percent shareholder
in a close corporation did not breach his fiduciary duty to the other
fifty percent shareholder by winding down the business when disharmony among the two shareholders was affecting managementemployee relationships and the plaintiff shareholder refused to help
manage the business.92
Scott and Leo Callier were both fifty percent shareholders in All
Steel Pipe & Tube, Inc., ("All Steel"). The board of directors at
All Steel consisted of Leo Callier, who also served as president, and
Felix Callier, who was Scott's nominee. 93 Leo handled the daily
management of All Steel while Scott's participation in the management was limited to occasional visits to the St. Louis headquarters.
The relationship between Scott and Leo eventually became
strained. After negotiations on redemption failed, Scott informed
Leo that liquidation was the only viable alternative, that employees
unnecessary to "wind down" the business should be terminated,
and that Leo should begin winding down the business. Scott subsequently changed his mind and informed Leo that he should continue running the business, although Scott refused to participate in
the management. 94 During the "wind down", both Scott and Leo
started businesses in competition with All Steel. Only one of these,
Leo's corporation, Callier Pipe and Tube, Inc., was in operation at
the time of the Callier litigation. Leo did not officially resign as
officer and director of All Steel prior to his incorporation of Callier. The trial court ordered Leo Callier to transfer certain shares
of his stock in All Steel to Scott Callier as damages for breach of
fiduciary duty. 95
91. 142 Ill. App. 3d 407, 491 N.E.2d 505 (5th Dist. 1986).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 410, 491 N.E.2d at 507. Felix, who was deceased at the time of the action,
took no active role in the management of the company and acted only as Scott's representative. Id.
94. Id. at 411, 491 N.E.2d at 507.
95. Id. at 409, 491 N.E.2d at 506. Defendant All Steel Pipe and Tube, Inc. is incorporated in Illinois. The circuit court heard the case on remand from the Illinois Appellate Court for the Fifth District. Prior to the remand, the circuit court had entered a
judgment ordering liquidation of the assets and business of All Steel. The appellate court
reversed that judgment. In its reversal, the court indicated that pursuant to section
86(a)(1) of the Business Corporation Act of 1933 (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, para.
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The appellate court 96 considered whether Leo acted improperly
in closing All Steel and whether he breached a fiduciary duty owed
to Scott. 97 The court suggested that Leo's actions prevented unnecessary loss and damage because Scott refused to assume management responsibility for All Steel and Leo had no legal
obligation to participate.9" Furthermore, the court stressed that
Leo did not take any of All Steel's assets, trade secrets, or confidential customer or supplier lists when he started his own competing
business. 99 Based upon the foregoing analysis, the court concluded that a damage award to Scott contradicted the manifest
weight of the evidence and the trial court's finding that Leo's actions were neither malicious nor fraudulent. i°
Finally, the court dispensed with the issue of whether Leo
breached fiduciary duties he owed to All Steel. 0 1 The court concluded Leo had not breached his duties, stressing the dissension
between Leo and Scott and the resultant dissatisfaction among All
02
Steel employees, who threatened to quit if Scott did not resign.
The court further noted that pursuant to the Close Corporation
Act, ' 3 All Steel would have been a prime candidate for dissolution. The appellate court in Callier then remanded the case to the
trial court with orders that distributions be made consistent with
its opinion."
157.86(a)(1)(1985)), Leo had failed to prove the deadlock in management or a threat of
irreparable injury requisite for mandating liquidation of assets and business of All Steel.
Callier, 142 Ill. App. 3d at 410, 491 NE.2d at 507.
96. Callier, 142 Ill. App. 3d 407, 491 N.E.2d 505. On appeal, the court confronted
the award of damages to Scott and All Steel. Initially the court reviewed the trial court's
determination of the going-concern value of All Steel. On that matter, it stated that the
trial court's conclusion was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, and would
therefore stand. Relying on that finding, the court observed that Scott did not sustain
damage as a result of the loss of his going-concern value interest because the going-concern value of All Steel was less than its actual cash value in the hands of the receiver. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 419, 491 N.E.2d at 513.
99. Id. at 420, 491 N.E.2d at 513.
100. Id. at 419, 491 N.E.2d at 513. Scott did not prove that he sustained damages.
His allegations were speculative and not the result of Leo's actions. Moreover, the attorneys' fees sought were not recoverable and Scott's testimony negated the possibility of an
award of punitive damages. Id.
101. Id. at 420, 491 N.E.2d at 514.
102. Id.
103. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, para. 1201-1216 (1985). The court noted that the
events of the case predated the Act, but that using the Act as a standard, All Steel might
have been dissolved. Callier, 142 Ill. App. 3d at 420, 491 N.E.2d at 514.
104. Callier, 142 Ill. App. 3d at 421, 491 N.E.2d at 515. The court also quickly
dispensed with the issue of who should bear the costs of receivership, stating that they
should be charged against the assets of the corporation. Id.
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In a similar case, Smith-Shrader v. Smith, 105 the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District held that a breach of fiduciary duty
existed when a prior employee exploited his position at a company
for his own economic benefit and to the detriment of the company.
In Smith-Shrader, two fifty percent shareholders, Smith and
Shrader, owned Smith-Shrader ("S.S.").16 After years of disagreement as to how the business should be run, Smith resigned as officer, director, and employee of S.S. and formed a competing
business known as R.S. Valve. Nonetheless, Smith retained his
fifty percent holding of S.S.. Prior to his resignation, Smith informed one of S.S.'s main customers of his planned resignation and
asked for its business.107 Smith made similar requests to additional
S.S. customers. Moreover, he indirectly solicited employees of S.S.
to work at R.S. Valve. °8 Shortly after Smith's resignation and incorporation of R.S. Valve, the solicited customers terminated their
contracts with S.S. and initiated business with R.S. Valve. Additionally, three employees of S.S. resigned and went to work for
R.S. Valve. As a result of these events, S.S.'s yearly gross commissions dropped drastically.109
In holding that Smith breached his fiduciary duty to Shrader
and S.S. as officer, director, and shareholder, 110 the court relied on
axioms of corporate law developed in H. Vincent Allen and Associates, Inc. v. Weis.II In H. Vincent Allen, the appellate court held
105. 136 Ill. App. 3d 571, 483 N.E.2d 283 (1st Dist. 1985).
106. Id. at 573, 483 N.E.2d at 285. Smith-Shrader was engaged in business as a
manufacturers' representative for companies which produced industrial valves, fittings,
and related items. Id.
107. Id. at 574, 483 N.E.2d 286. Conbraco was one of Smith-Shrader's five principal
manufacturers and accounted for approximately 70% of Smith-Shrader's commissions.
Id. at 576, 483 N.E.2d at 287.
108. Id. at 575, 483 N.E.2d at 286. Smith's sales representative, William Reid, contacted S.S. employees and told them to contact Smith concerning their possible employment at R.S. Valve. Id.
109. Id. at 576, 483 N.E.2d at 287. Prior to the employees' resignation, gross commissions were as follows: 1980 - $642,439; 1981 - $531,702. Following the resignation
the gross commissions were as follows: 1982 - $50,000; until the date of trial in 1983 $25,000. Id.
110. Id. at 577, 483 N.E.2d at 288.
111. 63 111. App. 3d 285, 379 N.E.2d 765 (1st Dist. 1978). In H. Vincent Allen, the
court indicated that (1) officers and directors of a corporation cannot actively exploit
their positions within the corporation for their own personal benefit; and (2) the activities
of officers and directors may not hinder or defeat the ability of the corporation to continue the business for which it was developed. Id. The facts in H. Vincent Allen are
similar to those in Smith-Shrader. After being terminated from his employment at an art
studio, Weis started his own business and eventually employed 13 former artists of H.
Vincent Allen. H. Vincent Allen's gross profit dropped. The court concluded that Weis
had breached his fiduciary duty even though he had not approached H. Vincent Allen's
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that an individual breached his fiduciary duty to a prior employer
even though he had not solicited his prior employer's employees
until after his termination." 2 As in H. Vincent Allen, Smith exploited his position at S.S. for his own economic benefit and to the
detriment of S. S.. 113 The court also stressed that Reid's position as
the initial contact with employees of S.S. failed to neutralize
Smith's follow-up solicitation." 4 The court therefore found his actions not justified even though Reid contacted the employees after
Smith's resignation."I5
Next, the court affirmed the trial court's finding that Smith tortiously interfered with the business relations of S.S..1 6 The court
ruled that Smith defeated his claim of privilege by breaching a fiduciary duty and soliciting S.S.'s key employees. "1 7 Furthermore, the
court disagreed with Smith's contention that the trial court erred
in awarding punitive damages and attorneys' fees based upon a
finding of malice." 8 The court reasoned that Smith-Shrader had
the burden of proving that Smith acted intentionally and without
just cause.' 9 Even a "subtle third party conduct" which induced
one employee to repudiate and breach his or her contract would be
sufficient. 20 The court did not disturb the lower court's finding because it believed S.S. clearly sustained that burden. Finally, the
court concluded that the evidence in the case supported the trial
court's finding that Smith forfeited his right to all compensation,' 2 '
employees until after his termination. H. Vincent Allen and Associates, Inc. v. Weis, 63
Ill. App. 3d 285, 379 N.E.2d 765 (1st Dist. 1978).
112. Id.
113. Smith-Shrader, 136 Ill. App. 3d at 577, 483 N.E.2d at 288.
114. Id. at 578, 483 N.E.2d at 288.
115. Id. at 578, 483 N.E.2d at 289 (quoting H. Vincent Allen & Associates, Inc. v.
Weis, 63 Ill. App. 3d 285, 292, 379 N.E.2d 765, 770 (1st Dist. 1978)). "The constructive
trust imposed upon officers and directors applies as well to transactions completed after
the termination of the party's association with the corporation if the transactions began
during the existence of the relationship, or were founded on information or knowledge
acquired during the relationship," (quoting Mile-O-Mo Fishing Club, Inc. v. Noble, 62
Ill. App. 2d 50, 57, 210 N.E.2d 12, 15 (1965)).
116. Smith-Shrader, 136 Ill. App. 3d at 579-80, 483 N.E.2d at 289-90. The reviewing
court concluded that the trial court's finding was not against the manifest weight of the
evidence. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1977).
117. Smith-Shrader, 136 Ill. App. 3d at 580, 483 N.E.2d at 290.
118. Id.
119. Id. (citing Getschow v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 111 111. App. 3d 522, 444
N.E.2d 579 (1st Dist. 1982)).
120. Smith-Shrader, 136 Ill. App. 3d at 580, 483 N.E.2d at 290 (quoting Hannigan v.
Sears Roebuck & Co., 410 F.2d 285 (7th Cir. 1969)).
121. Smith-Shrader, 136 Ill. App. 3d at 581, 483 N.E.2d at 291. The trial court
adopted the rationale expressed in ABC Trans National Transport, Inc. v. Aeronautics
Forwarders, Inc., 90 Ill. App. 3d 817, 838, 413 N.E.2d 1299, 1315 (1st Dist. 1980):
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and dismissed Smith's
counterclaim for dissolution based on share1 22
holder deadlock.

Another important corporations case decided during the Survey
year involved trade secrets. In Junkunc v. S.J. Advanced Technology and Manufacturing Corp.,123 the Illinois Appellate Court for
the First District held that General Machinery's process for manufacture of a jet seal did not constitute a protectable trade secret. In
Junkunc, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction,
seeking to enjoin the defendants, S.J. Advanced Technology and
Manufacturing Corporation, from making any use of the manufacturing process developed by General Machinery to manufacture
fuel nozzle seals.
The trial court denied the motion and the plain1 24
tiffs appealed.

Initially, the appellate court focused on the general authority of
courts to grant preliminary injunctions.

25

On this matter, the

court relied upon the well-founded standard that the party seeking
a preliminary injunction must establish the existence of the following factors by a preponderance of the evidence: "a certain and
clearly ascertained right needs protection, irreparable injury will
occur without the injunction, no adequate remedy at law exists,
and there is a probability of success on the merits of the case. "126
The court stated that a reviewing court should only consider substantive issues when a trial court has abused its discretion. 27 Further, the appellate court indicated that it would not disturb the
trial court's findings unless
the findings were against the manifest
1 28
weight of the evidence.

"[W]ithin the actual period of tortious conduct, salary forfeiture is required because the
agent's services are not being properly performed .... As a matter of public policy...,
one who breaches fiduciary duties has no entitlement to compensation during a willful or
deliberate course of conduct adverse to the principal's interests." Id.
122. Smith-Shrader, 136 Ill. App. 3d at 582, 483 N.E.2d at 291. The Smith-Shrader
court relied on the 1978 appellate court decision of Callier v. Callier, 61 Ill. App. 3d
1011, 378 N.E.2d 405 (5th Dist. 1978), which preceded the Callier appellate court decision, discussed supra notes 91-104 and accompanying text. "[T]he evidence shows ...
two equal shareholders who were unable to get along and unable to reach agreement...
as to the redemption of one's shares by the other or to the terms of voluntary dissolution.
This is not equivalent to an inability of the corporation to perform the functions for
which it was created." The Smith-Shrader court thus concluded that Smith failed to
prove the existence of a legitimate shareholder deadlock. Smith-Shrader, 136 Ill. App. 3d
at 582, 483 N.E.2d at 291.
123. 149 Ill. App. 3d 114, 498 N.E.2d 1179 (1st Dist. 1986).
124. Id. at 115, 498 N.E.2d at 1180-81.
125. Id. at 117-18, 498 N.E.2d at 1182.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 118, 498 N.E.2d at 1182. The appellate court noted:
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The only issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in
holding that the plaintiffs did not possess a protectable trade secret
for the manufacture of jet seals. 2 9 Accordingly, the appellate
court began its analysis by defining a trade secret as "a plan or
process, tool, mechanism, compound, or information data utilized
by a person in business operations and known only to that person
and such limited other persons to whom it may be necessary to
confide it".' The appellate court then listed several factors to be
considered in determining whether information is a trade secret,' 3
but examined only the extent of the measures that General Machinery took to guard the secrecy of the seal manufacturing process. I2 In addressing this single factor, the court stressed that only
this factor was determinative of whether a trade secret exists. "
Upon reviewing the record,' 34 the appellate court stated that the
trial court's denial of the preliminary injunction was not against
the manifest weight of the evidence.' 35
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Jiganti argued that General MaThe trial court found that (1) no certain and clearly ascertained right existed;
(2) no irreparable injury would occur without the injunction, because plaintiffs
ha[d] already been competing with others and [would] continue to do so
whether or not the court [issued] the injunction; (3) plaintiffs failed to establish
that no adequate remedy at law existed; and (4) no likelihood of success on the
merits existed, because the evidence failed to reveal a trade secret.
Id. at 118, 498 N.E.2d at 1183.
129. Id. at 119, 498 N.E.2d at 1182.
130. Id. (citing ILG Industries, Inc. v. Scott, 49 Ill. 2d 88, 93, 273 N.E.2d 393 (1971);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 757, Comment b, at 6 (1939)).
131. Junkunc, 149 Ill. App. 3d at 119, 489 N.E.2d at 1183. The court set forth the
following six factors:
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of the business, (2) the
extent to which it is known by employees and others involved in the business,
(3) the extent of measures taken to guard the secrecy of the information, (4) the
value of the information to the business and to its competitors, (5) the amount
of effort or money expended to develop the information, and (6) the ease or
difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or duplicated
by others.
Id. (citing ILG Industries, Inc. v. Scott, 49 Ill. 2d 88, 93, 273 N.E.2d 393 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 757, Comment b, at 6 (1939)).
132. Junkunc, 149 Ill. App. 3d at 119, 489 N.E.2d at 1183.
133. Id.
134. Id. The appellate court acknowledged that General Machinery presented evidence that only they and one of the individual defendants knew the total manufacturing
process. The court, however, also indicated that the defendant produced evidence that
conflicted with General Machinery's. Id.
135. Junkunc, 149 I11.App. 3d at 120, 489 N.E.2d at 1183. Concerning the relationship between General Machinery and one of the individual defendants, a son of one of the
four founding fathers of General Machinery, the Junkunc court stated that the relationship illustrated that any of General Machinery's secrecy measures directed toward company employees did not apply to the individual defendant. Id.
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chinery demonstrated the existence of a trade secret for its manufacture of jet seals.1 36 Justice Jiganti stressed that each of the
several factors elucidated by the majority must be weighed equally
in determining the existence of a trade secret and that the majority
erred in only addressing the extent of the measures taken to guard
the secrecy of the information. Therefore, after evaluating each
factor independently, Justice Jiganti concluded that
General Ma1 37
chinery established the existence of a trade secret.
III.

SECURITIES REGULATION

The Illinois Supreme Court did not decide any securities regulation cases during the Survey period. 138 Two appellate court decisions regarding securities regulation, however, are significant. In
Conroy v. Andeck Resources,1 39 the Illinois Appellate Court for the
First District ruled that futures contracts based on financial instruments are not securities as defined by the Illinois Securities Law
and that mere registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC") as a broker-dealer does not put an individual
within the definition of a dealer. In Conroy, the plaintiffs, Conroy,
O'Donnell, Burrell, and Gorman purchased units in an oil and gas
limited partnership sold by the defendant Andeck Resources
through a private security offering. Each of the plaintiffs belonged
to the Chicago Board of Trade (the "CBOT"), a registered futures
exchange and contract market,"4 and 0 'Donnell and Burrell also
were registered with the SEC. In addition, O'Donnell once made a
series of securities trades from his own account on the Chicago
Board Options Exchange (the "CBOE").
136. Junkunc, 149 Ill. App. 3d at 120-21, 489 N.E.2d at 1184 (Jiganti, J., dissenting).
137. Id. Justice Jiganti noted several factors in support of his conclusion that General Machinery possessed a protectable trade secret. First, Justice Jiganti indicated that
only five people knew the entire process of manufacturing the seals. Also, he relied upon
the fact that over a nine-year period, General Machinery spent $1,700,000 to develop the
manufacturing process. Finally, Justice Jiganti stated that the six factor test was satisfied
because no competitor had successfully duplicated General Machinery's seal. Id.
138. Rockford Life Insurance Co. v. Department of Revenue, 112 Ill. 2d 174, 492
N.E.2d 1278 (1986), discussed in the State and Local Tax article of this issue, is relevant
to the securities regulation. In Rockford, the court held that "Ginnie Mae" securities
were not exempt from state and local taxes merely because they were guaranteed by, as
opposed to issued by, an agency of the federal government. Rockford Life Insurance
involved a personal property tax imposed on the company's capital stock in 1978, the last
year such taxes were collected. The securities were issued by private investors based on
pools of mortgages assembled by them and guaranteed by the Government National
Mortgage Association. Id.
139. 137 Ill. App. 3d 375, 484 N.E.2d 525 (1st Dist. 1985).
140. Id. at 377, 484 N.E.2d at 528.
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Subsequent to the purchase of the limited partnership units, the
plaintiffs discovered that the units had never been registered in Illinois as required by state securities rules.14 ' Relying on section 13 of
the Illinois Securities Law of 1953 (the "Law"), 142 the plaintiffs
elected to rescind the sale and tender the limited partnership units
back to Andeck. Accordingly, they initiated a suit seeking rescission and alternative relief.14 3 Following the trial court's dismissal
of the claim against Andeck, the appellate court confronted the
issue of whether the plaintiffs were entitled to the statutory remedy
of rescission set forth in section 13 of the Law.'
The court's initial inquiry in determining this issue was whether the plaintiffs
were "dealers" under the Illinois Securities Law. 145 Sales to dealers
are exempt from the Law's registration requirements.' 46 The determinative factor was whether the plaintiffs engaged in the securities dealing activity' 47 contemplated by the Law.' 48 The court
advanced several considerations to aid in this determination.
First, the court noted that, pursuant to the legislative history of
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act (the
"CFTC"),49 the definition of a commodity includes futures con141.

Id.

142. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1211/2, para. 137.13 (1985).
143. Conroy, 137 Ill.
App. 3d at 378, 484 N.E.2d at 429. Originally, Andeck's attorney, McAfee, was included as a defendant in the case. Counts against McAfee were
dismissed by the trial court for lack of personal jurisdiction. The plaintiffs requested an
interlocutory appeal on this issue and the appellate court affirmed the trial court decision.
Id.
144. Id. at 379, 484 N.E.2d at 529 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1211/2, para. 137.13
(1985)).
145. Conroy, 137 Ill. App. 3d at 379, 484 N.E.2d at 529.
146. Id.
147. Id. The trial court concluded that the plaintiffs had engaged in securities dealing based on the following facts: (1) plaintiffs had dealt with financial futures contracts in
the past; (2) plaintiffs were members of the CBOT and they were members or had an
automatic right to belong to and trade on the CBOE; and (3) plaintiffs were registered
with the SEC as "broker-dealers." Id.
148. Id. (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121/2, para. 137.2-7 (1981)). Paragraph
137.2-7 provides in relevant part:
'Dealer' means any person, other than a salesperson, or controlling person and
other than a bank organized under the banking laws of this State or of the
United States or other than a trust company organized under the laws of this
State, who engages in this State, either for all or part of his or her time, directly
or indirectly, as agent, broker or principal, in the business of offering, selling,
buying and selling, or otherwise dealing or trading in securities issued by another person.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1211/, para. 137.2-7 (1985) (emphasis in original).
149. Conroy, 137 Ill.
App. 3d at 380, 484 N.E.2d at 530. In 1974, the CTFC extensively amended the Commodity Exchange Act (the "CEA") of 1936. One of the purposes of the amendment was to enlarge the definition of commodity to encompass the
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tracts based on financial instruments.15 0 The court emphasized
that the Illinois Securities Law specifically exempted from its definition of security any commodity futures contracts offered or sold
to the public on a registered contract market. 15 Pursuant to the
Law, the regulation of futures contracts was not dependent upon
the underlying commodity on which the futures contract was written. 152 The court thus concluded that the commodity futures trading activities conducted at the CBOT did not fall within the
definition of securities trading.' 53 Instead, the plaintiffs traded
fu54
tures contracts on the CBOT, a registered contract market.1
Next, the court determined that the plaintiffs were not dealers in
securities under the Illinois Securities Law. Although membership
in the CBOT gives members an automatic right to join the CBOE,
a national securities exchange,' 55 the court held that mere membership in the CBOT or mere exercise of the automatic right to membership is not equal to actual trading on the CBOE. 56 Only one
plaintiff, O'Donnell, exercised his membership right and actually
traded at the CBOE. Because O'Donnell's situation involved a difficult factual determination, the court remanded to the trial court
the issue of whether O'Donnell
qualified as a "dealer" or simply as
57
an investor or trader.
futures markets expected to expand to cover non-traditional goods and services like futures contracts based on financial instruments. S. REP. No. 850, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 13,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2087, 2101. The Amendment also was
enacted to "provide a uniform regulatory structure covering all futures trading in both
the regulated or conventional and previously unregulated or nonconventional commodities." S. REP. No. 850, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2087, 2098. The court stated that the legislative history of the CEA and its
amendments clearly suggested that all futures contracts, regardless of the underlying
commodity, were to be regarded and treated as commodities rather than securities. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 383, 484 N.E.2d at 531 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1211/2, para. 137.2-1
(1985)).
152. Conroy, 137 I11.App. 3d at 383, 484 N.E.2d at 532.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 384, 484 N.E.2d at 533.
156. Id. at 384-85, 484 N.E.2d at 533 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1211/2, para. 137.27 (1985)).
157. Conroy, 137 I11.App. 3d at 387-88, 484 N.E.2d at 534-35 (quoting 2 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATIONS, ch. 8B, at 1296-97 (2d ed 1961).) The distinction between a
private investor and a dealer has been articulated as follows:
[A dealer] ordinarily tries to obtain a regular clientele. He is apt to transact a
substantial portion of his business directly with investors rather than with other
dealers or through exchange members .... A dealer ordinarily holds himself
out as one engaged in buying and selling securities at a regular place of business.
And his business.., is ordinarily characterized by a regular turnover, whereas
a trader's transactions are generally more irregular in both volume and time. A
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Finally, the Conroy court noted that mere registration with the
SEC is insufficient to establish status as a dealer because an individual conceivably could register but never deal directly in securities
on the CBOE. I 8 Therefore, the court held that the plaintiffs were
entitled to a trial on their claim. 59
Another Survey period decision relevant to securities regulation
involved investment contracts. In Boldon v. Chiappa,60the Illinois
Appellate Court for the Fourth District held that the Illinois Securities Law governed investment contracts and that the tender requirement contained in the Law could be fulfilled during the trial
of an action for rescission. On July 22, 1980, the plaintiff and defendants entered into a written contract whereby the plaintiff made
a five thousand dollar "non-refundable investment" in the defendants' business, Firearms Unlimited. Under the contract, the plaintiff received a commission of two and one-half percent of the
monthly gross profits and discounts on guns and ammunition while
in the defendants' employ. The contract also recited other duties
the plaintiff agreed to perform.1 61 Pursuant to the contract, the
plaintiff purchased guns and ammunition. On July 23, 1982, the
plaintiff gave notice of rescission of the contract because the employment relationship had deteriorated. Subsequently, the plaintiff
filed suit seeking recovery of the amount paid under the contract
plus interest and attorneys' fees. He sought rescission of the investment contract based upon the defendants' 162 failure to comply
with the filing requirements of section 4(G) of the Illinois Securitrader, on the other hand, does not handle other people's money or securities;
he does not 'make a market'; and he does not furnish the services which are
usually provided by other dealers ....

Needless to say, a person does not have

to exhibit all or any given number of these dealer characteristics in order to be
considered a dealer.
2 Loss, supra, at 1297.
158. Conroy, 137 Ill. App. 3d at 385, 484 N.E.2d at 533.
159. Id. at 391, 484 N.E.2d at 537. O'Donnell's case was remanded for further hearing on the issue of whether he engaged in the business of securities trading or dealing. Id.
160. 140 Ill. App. 3d 913, 489 N.E.2d 6 (4th Dist. 1986).
161. Id. at 915, 489 N.E.2d at 8. The contract contained the following language:
In consideration hereof, the employee is entitled to the following benefits:
(1) All currently produced firearms on a pre-ordered, pre-paid basis at dealer's
costs plus handling and sales tax. Handling costs shall include among other
costs such items as shipping costs, long distance telephone calls, etc. (2) All
currently made related items in the gun field at dealer's costs plus handling and
sales tax on a pre-ordered, pre-paid basis. Related items include ammunition,
cleaning kits, gun cases, etc.
Id.
162. Id. at 913, 489 N.E.2d at 6. The defendants were cited as Sam Chiappa et al., d/
b/a Firearms Unlimited, a Partnership. Id.
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ties Law.16 3 The plaintiff appealed after the dismissal of his second
amended complaint.'
The appellate court first stated that no securities had been issued.165 Rather, the dispute arose after dissatisfaction with an investment contract.1 66 Nonetheless, the court observed that under
the Illinois Securities Law, "security" was defined to include investment contracts.1 67 The court thus proceeded to apply the filing requirement of section 4(G) and the tender requirement of
section 12(D). 1 6 1 In doing so, the court concluded that the defendants violated Illinois Blue Sky Laws by failing to file a mandatory
report with the Secretary of State1 69 indicating
that the statutory
1 70
notice and tender requirements were met.
The defendants sought retroactive application of the amended
section 4(G), which would eliminate a filing requirement. 71 The
court refused to apply the section retroactively, asserting that the
defendants had waived this defense by not including it in their answer before trial.1 72 The court further noted that, even absent a
finding of waiver, the applicable law was the law that existed prior
to the amendment, at the time of the alleged action.1 73 Finally, the
court considered whether the plaintiff had met the jurisdictional
requirement of tender included in section 12(D) of the Law.1 74 The
163. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1211/2, para. 137.4(G) (1985).
164. Boldon, 140 Ill. App. 3d at 916, 489 N.E.2d at 8. In the complaint, plaintiff
alleged that no securities were received from the transaction, that he thereby tendered his
only copy of the contract to the court, and that he derived no income or interest from the
securities in question. The plaintiff admitted however, that he had purchased from the
defendants various guns and ammunition under the agreement. Consequently, the plaintiff indicated that he had retained all the guns and ammunition purchased from the defendants under the agreement and was ready, willing, and able to tender the guns and
ammunition to the court in return for the payment of the purchase prices by the defendants. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAt. ch. 1211/2, para. 137.2-1 (1985)).
168. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1211/2, para. 137.12(A) (1985).
169. Boldon, 140 Ill. App. 3d at 916-17, 489 N.E.2d at 9 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
1211/2, para. 137.4(G) (1985)). In Illinois, securities regulation laws commonly are referred to as Blue Sky Laws.
170. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1211/2, paras. 137.13(A), (B) (1985).
171. Boldon, 140 Ill. App. 3d at 917, 489 N.E.2d at 29 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
1211/2, para. 137.4(G) (1985)). Amended section 4(G) was not effective until January 1,
1984.
172. Boldon, 140 Ill. App. 3d at 917-18, 489 N.E.2d at 9-10 (citing Downes Swimming Pool, Inc. v. North Shore National Bank, 124 Ill. App. 3d 457, 462, 464 N.E.2d
761, 765 (1st Dist. 1984)).
173. Boldon, 140 Ill. App. 3d at 918, 489 N.E.2d at 10.
174. Id.
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Boldon court stated that section 12(D) requires a purchaser to
tender to the seller or the court the securities sold.'75 When no
securities are involved, the court asserted that the purchaser must
tender the contract of sale. 176 The court maintained that, although
notice of election to rescind must be made within six months of
learning that the sale is voidable, 177 a similar time limit did not
constrain the tender requirement. ' 78 The court held that the plaintiff complied with the Law by tendering his copy of the investment
contract to the court. 17 9 Moreover, the court ruled that guns and
ammunition were not securities for the purposes of the Law 180 and,
even assuming they were securities, dismissal of the case would be
premature because tender of them could have been made during
trial.' 8
IV.

COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS

A. Debtors and Creditors
The Illinois Supreme Court decided one case during the Survey
period that significantly affected debtor-creditor law.' 82 In P.A.
Bergner & Co. v. Lloyd Jewelers,183 the court held that a dated letter agreement entered into by a creditor department store and a
175.
176.

Id. at 919, 489 N.E.2d at 10.
Id.

177.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1211/2, para. 137.13(B) (1985).

178. Id. at para. 137.13(A).
179. Boldon, 140 Ill. App. 3d at 920, 489 N.E.2d at 11. The Boldon court stated:
The statute establishes no time limit on tender as it does on notice. Tender
must be made of the identical shares purchased (Printenney v. Mantel, 234 Ill.
App. 137 (1924)), and all shares purchased (Glen v. Dodson, 344 Ill. 473, 180
N.E. 393 (1932)). Tender may be made to the seller before trial (Gowdy v.
Richter, 20 Ill. App. 3d 514, 314 N.E.2d 549 (1974)), or at trial (Morrison v.
Farmers Elevator Co., 319 Ill. 372, 150 N.E. 330 (1925); (Weisbrod v. Lowitz,
282 Ill. App. 252 (1935)). Once made, it must be held open up to the time of
judgment (Tobey v. Sundling, 25 Ill. App. 3d 205, 323 N.E.2d 30 (1974)). Of
course, the tender need not be made to the seller at all but may be made directly
to the court. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1211/2, para. 137.13(A) (1981).
Boldon, 140 Ill. App. 3d at 920, 489 N.E.2d at 11 (quoting Bultman v. Bishop, 120 Ill.
App. 3d 138, 142, 457 N.E.2d 994, 997 (5th Dist. 1983)).
180. Bolden, 140 Ill. App. 3d at 920, 489 N.E.2d at 11.
181. Id. at 920-21, 489 N.E.2d at 11.
182. In re Thebus, 108 Ill. 2d 255, 256, 483 N.E. 2d 1258 (1985), a professional ethics
case, is significant to debtor and credit principles to the extent that it established the
following principle: An action for conversion of funds may not be maintained to satisfy a
mere obligation to pay money when the relationship of debtor and creditor exists, and an
action for conversion will not lie for money represented by a general debt or obligation,
since at all times the funds belonged to the plaintiff although the defendant converted
them to his own use. Id. at 260-61, 483 N.E.2d at 1260-61.
183. 112 Ill. 2d 196, 492 N.E.2d 1288 (1986).
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debtor jewelry company constituted an account stated regarding
the sums owed as of that date. The plaintiff, Bergner, operated a
chain of retail department stores. The defendant, Lloyd, maintained a retail jewelry business. In 1967, the parties entered into a
"Departmental Lease" in which Lloyd agreed to operate the jewelry department in Bergner's Peoria store."l 4 A subsequently executed Master Department Lease contained identical provisions.
The agreement provided for a minimum guaranteed rental and for
additional rental based on a percentage of Lloyd's net sales. Other
provisions required delivery of cash receipts to Bergner's cashier by
the close of each business day and processing of charge accounts
1 85
and installment payments through Bergner's credit department.
Additionally, Bergner agreed to receive and hold in trust all sums
collected until an accounting was made. The agreement did not
oblige Bergner to segregate these funds but did require him to settle each monthly account with Lloyd on or before the last day of
the next month. Bergner agreed to deduct charges due it and pay
the balance to Lloyd after it made an accounting
to Lloyd of
18 6
Lloyd's business for the preceding month.
In January of 1977, Robert Congress, president and sole shareholder of Lloyd, and officer of Bergner, signed a letter agreement.
Pursuant to the letter agreement, Lloyd became indebted to Bergner for $161,220.39 in excess rentals and $125,361.00 for fixtures,
with the fixture expenses due February 28, 1977.187 Bergner also
agreed to deduct from Lloyd's statement monthly payments of
$10,000 on the excess rental and to review the matter on April 30,8
18
1977 for the purpose of accelerating the principal payments.
184. Id. at 199, 492 N.E.2d at 1289.
185. Id. at 199, 492 N.E.2d at 1289-90.
186. Id. at 199-200, 492 N.E.2d at 1289-90. A Master Department Lease executed
on January 21, 1975 contained the same provisions. Id. The provision stated:
Lessor shall receive and hold in trust until an accounting is made in respect
thereto, all sums collected, including cash sales and approved credit sales of
merchandise or services rendered by the Lessee, but shall not be obligated to
segregate said funds or keep them in a separate account. Accounting and settlement shall be made by lessor with lessee for each calendar month's business on
or before the last day of the next succeeding month. Each month as the Lessor
makes an accounting to the Lessee of the business of the Lessee for the preceding calendar month, it shall, after deducting its proper charges and any and all
sums due from Lessee to Lessor, pay over to the Lessee the balance due to it
through and including the last day of the preceding calendar month.
Id. Bergner consistently failed to deduct fixture costs and excess rentals in its accounting
to Lloyd. Nonetheless, Lloyd's financial statements for 1972-1976 indicated liabilities for
accrued rent. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
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Congress, in his capacity as officer, executed a promissory note
payable to Bergner for each debt. On July 31, 1977, Bergner withheld the entire monthly sum due Lloyd because Lloyd failed to pay
the fixture and rent charges.'8 9 Bergner notified Lloyd by letter of
the withholding and advised Lloyd of the balance remaining on
each indebtedness. Bergner further indicated that it would terminate Lloyd's lease if the entire amount was not paid within thirty
days. 19° Bergner also withheld Lloyd's sales proceeds for two
months and applied them to the amounts due.191 On October 14,
1977, Lloyd vacated the premises and notified Bergner that it considered the lease agreement terminated. Subsequently, Bergner
brought suit against Lloyd seeking $82,292.72 based upon the letter agreement as an account stated. Bergner also sought judgment
against92 Congress in the amounts of the balances due on the
notes.
Following extensive lower court proceedings, 93 the supreme
court declared the letter agreement of January 1977 an account
stated for the sums owed as of that time. 194 The court held that
Bergner's forbearance in enforcing collection of the sums due at
that time constituted consideration for the two notes executed by
Congress. ' 95 Furthermore, the Bergner court concluded that Congress executed the notes in his capacity as sole shareholder and
president. 96 Accordingly, the court ruled in favor of Bergner on
its claims and remanded to the trial court the issue of the amount
of damages. 197
189. Id.
190. Id. at 201, 492 N.E.2d at 1290.
191. Id. Bergner released some money to Lloyd for the purpose of making payments
to other creditors. Id.
192. Id. Lloyd counterclaimed, seeking damages for breach of contract. The counterclaim also included an allegation of tortious interference with contractual relationships
against two corporations affiliated with Bergner. Id. at 198, 492 N.E.2d at 1289. An
account stated "arises where there have been transactions between a debtor and a creditor
resulting in the creation of matured debts and the parties agreement compute a balance
which the debtor promises to accept in full payment for items of account. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 17 (5th ed. 1979).
193. Bergner, 112 Ill. 2d at 198-99, 492 N.E.2d at 1289. The jury awarded a verdict
of $670,000 in favor of Lloyd on the counterclaim against Bergner and was in favor of the
affiliated corporations on the tortious interference count. The circuit court then directed
a verdict in favor of Bergner on the letter agreement count and allowed a new trial on the
issue of damages. On appeal, the appellate court reversed the judgment entered on
Lloyd's breach of contract counterclaim. Bergner then petitioned for leave to appeal. Id.
194. Id. at 202, 492 N.E.2d at 1291.
195. Bergner, 112 Ill. 2d at 202, 492 N.E.2d at 1291.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 203-04, 492 N.E.2d at 1291-92. The Illinois Supreme Court stated that
the manner in which the verdicts had been returned by the trial court did not disclose
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The Illinois Appellate Court for the Second District addressed a
significant bankruptcy issue in In re Marriage of Lueck. gs In
Lueck, the court held that a sentence imposed as a sanction for
failure to pay child support was subject to an automatic stay under
the Bankruptcy Act. 199 The defendant Lueck divorced his wife
and subsequently failed to make child support payments for a
number of years. Subsequently, the court held him in contempt
and sentenced him to thirty days in jail.2co Twenty days later, and
prior to serving his sentence, Lueck filed a voluntary chapter 13
petition in bankruptcy with a plan that provided for one hundred
percent payment of the child support arrearage. Lueck also moved
for a stay of his jail sentence until the dismissal or completion of
his bankruptcy petition. The trial court denied Lueck's motion and
the appellate court reversed.2 °1
The appellate court concluded that Lueck established a right to
an automatic stay of his jail sentence pursuant to section 362(a) of
the Federal Bankruptcy Act.2 °2 The court clarified that the trial
court had issued the contempt order to ensure the payment of the
whether the jury intended to award Bergner $36,688.33 or a greater amount. Furthermore, the court indicated that Lloyd and Congress had the burden of proving that the
amount due under the agreement was erroneous. The court dismissed Lloyd's counterclaim for breach of contract. After comparing the facts to the unambiguous language of
the contract and the clearly defined contractual obligations of the parties, the court stated
that Bergner strictly adhered to the provisions of the contract. In its concluding remarks,
the court dispensed with Lloyd's allegation that Bergner violated its implied obligation of
good faith. The Bergner court determined that the allegation did not warrant a breach of
contract award. The court noted that, assuming the question of good faith had been
appropriate, Bergner's act of allowing the indebtedness to grow so large did not prevent
Lloyd from retaining the money for later payments. Id.
198. 140 Ill. App. 3d 836, 489 N.E.2d 443 (2nd Dist. 1986).
199. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (Supp. III 1979). Filing of a petition under chapter 13 of the
Act operates as a stay of the following actions:
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment
of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other pending against the debtor that
was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case
under this title; (2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against the property
of the estate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case
under this title; (3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or
property from the estate; ....
Id. One of the exceptions to the automatic stay set out in section 362(b) involves "the
collection of alimony, maintenance, or support form property that is not the property of
the estate." Id.
200. Lueck, 140 Ill. App. 3d at 837, 489 N.E.2d 444. The issuance of a mittimus by
the clerk was stayed for three weeks, to allow for payment of the child support arrearage
by the defendant, and, thus, the purging of the contempt. Id.
201. Id.
202. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (Supp. III 1979). See supra note 199.
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child support arrearage 20 3 and not, as the plaintiff suggested, to uphold the dignity of the court.2 °4
The court also determined that the automatic stay provision applied even though the trial court entered the contempt order before
Lueck filed his bankruptcy petition. 20 5 The court buttressed its position by analyzing the interaction between sections 362(b)(2) and
362(a)(2) of the Federal Bankruptcy Act.20 6 The court reasoned
that, pursuant to section 362(b)(2), proceedings to collect child
support from property not part of the estate are exempt from the
automatic stay. 2°7 The court then stated that, for purposes of a
chapter 13 bankruptcy, section 1306(a)(2) provides that property
of the estate includes earnings from services performed by the
debtor after the commencement of the bankruptcy case but before
its dismissal or closing.208 The court reasoned that, although section 362 does not bar an action against non-estate property to collect arrearages in child support, Lueck had no non-estate property
against which to proceed.20 9 Therefore, the court granted Lueck's
motion to stay the prior contempt order against the property of the
estate. 10
B. Banks and Banking
The most significant Survey period cases affecting banks and
banking addressed the transfer of jointly-held property. The Illinois Supreme Court considered the transfer of funds held in joint
bank accounts. An appellate court case also addressed the transfer
of an undivided joint tenancy interest in investment securities.
Read together, the cases illustrate that, in an action challenging a
purported transfer of jointly-held property, the nature of the property involved determines the applicable law.
203. Lueck, 140 Ill. App. 3d at 838, 489 N.E.2d at 445.
204. Id. If the contempt order had been invoked to uphold the dignity of the court,
the proceeding would have been exempt from the automatic stay provision of section
362(a). Id. (citing In re Dumas, 19 Bankr. 676 (9th Cir. 1982); David v. Hooker, Ltd.,
560 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1977). The Lueck court, however, stated that the purpose of
Lueck's contempt order was to compel expenditure of money from his estate. Id.
205. Lueck, 140 Ill. App. 3d at 838-39, 489 N.E.2d at 445. The court cited the Federal Bankruptcy Act, supra note 202, and asserted that the language clearly supported
granting the automatic stay. See also In re Thayer, 24 Bankr. 491 (W.D. Wis. 1982)
(attorney and wife held in contempt of bankruptcy court for seeking to enforce state
court's pre-bankruptcy finding of contempt for failure to pay child support).
206. Lueck, 140 Ill. App. 3d 838-39, 489 N.E.2d at 445.
207. Id. at 839, 489 N.E.2d at 445.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
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The Illinois Supreme Court decision of Pescetto v. Colonial Trust
and Savings Bank 21' elucidated a critical development in laws affecting the transfer of funds in joint savings accounts. In Pescetto,
the court held that although jointly-held property is generally subject to the laws of joint tenancy, the contract between a bank and
its depositors governs joint bank accounts.21 2 The case involved a
wife's action to establish her right to funds held jointly with her
deceased husband in a Colonial Trust savings account. A relevant
portion of the signature card provided that the bank was authorized to recognize any of the signatures on the card for payment of
funds or for any business transaction regarding the account. The
depositors agreed that the sums deposited by either or both of the
joint depositors were owned by them jointly, with a right of survivorship. Moreover, the sums were subject to the order or receipt of
either of them. Finally, payment on the order of either of the joint
depositors or to the survivor was valid and discharged the bank
from liability.21 3
Without Mrs. Pescetto's knowledge, Mr. Pescetto took out loans
with the bank and pledged the savings account as collateral. Subsequently, Mr. Pescetto died leaving the loans in default. The bank
enforced its security interest in the savings account. Mrs. Pescetto
then instituted an action to establish her right to the jointly-held
funds. The trial court granted summary judgment for Mrs. Pescetto. 2 4 On appeal, the trial court decision was reversed and summary judgment was entered for the bank.215 Mrs. Pescetto then
appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court.216
Mrs. Pescetto argued that the 1984 Illinois Supreme Court decision of Harms v. Sprague217 controlled the case and mandated that
the bank's security interest be held invalid. In Harms, two joint
tenants held a parcel of real estate. When one of the tenants mortgaged his interest and subsequently died, the mortgagee claimed an
interest in the real estate. The court held that a mortgage executed
by less than all joint tenants does not sever the joint tenancy.21 s
Instead, the court concluded that the mortgage created a lien on
211.
212.
(1986).
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

111 Ill. 2d 314, 489 N.E.2d 1365 (1986).
Pescetto v. Colonial Trust and Savings Bank, 111 111. 2d 314, 489 N.E.2d 1365
Id. at 315-16, 489 N.E.2d at 1366.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 315, 489 N.E.2d at 1366.
105 Ill. 2d 215, 473 N.E.2d 930 (1984).
Id.
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only the interest of the mortgaging party. 219 Accordingly, upon
the death of the mortgaging tenant in Harms, the surviving tenant
took the entire interest free and clear of the
lien because the mort220
gaging tenant's interest ceased to exist.
The Illinois Supreme Court disagreed with Mrs. Pescetto's application of Harms to the Pescetto case. 2 2' The court distinguished
the two cases based upon the type of jointly owned property.2 2 2
Harms involved a joint tenancy in real property, whereas Pescetto
involved a joint bank account.2 23 The court rejected the Harms
rationale and held that a joint bank account is subject to the provisions of the contract between the bank and its depositors: 224 a determination that necessitated an interpretation of the signature
card. The court then held that the contract clearly authorized the
bank to honor the signature of either depositor in transactions involving the interests of both joint tenants. 225 Accordingly, Mr.
Pescetto's signature was deemed sufficient to pledge the entire account as collateral for the loan and the bank possessed an enforceable security interest against the funds.2 26
In Walsh v. First National Bank of Joliet,227 the Illinois Appellate Court for the Third District addressed an issue similar to that
in Pescetto but reached a different conclusion. In Walsh, the court
considered whether an undivided joint tenancy interest in investment securities was capable of being pledged despite the failure to
join, and without the knowledge of, the other joint tenant. The
court held that the joint tenant, having knowledge of the transaction, effectively pledged his undivided one-half interest in the
securities.2 28
Robert Walsh, owner of Joliet Blacktop, Inc., gave four promissory notes to First National Bank of Joliet. The notes included the
signatures of Robert and Helen Walsh, as officers and in their individual capacities. As security for the notes, Walsh pledged 1,110
shares of First National. The signatures of both Robert and Helen
appeared on the stock power. Subsequently, Robert Walsh disappeared without paying the notes. When First National notified
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Id. at 223, 473 N.E.2d at 934.
Id. at 224, 473 N.E.2d at 934.
Pescetto, 111 Il1. 2d at 316-17, 489 N.E.2d at 1366.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 316-17, 489 N.E.2d at 1366-67.
140 Ill. App. 3d 689, 489 N.E.2d 337 (3rd Dist. 1986).
Id. at 692, 489 N.E.2d at 339.
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Helen of its intention to sell Robert's one-half interest in the First
National shares pursuant to its security agreement, Helen informed
the bank that she had signed neither the notes nor the stock power
and that her signature was a forgery.2 2 9
At the appellate level, the court considered whether Robert
Walsh had pledged an undivided joint tenancy interest in the investment securities despite his failure to join and without the
knowledge of Helen Walsh.2 3° The court concluded that the bank
acquired an enforceable security interest in Robert's undivided
one-half interest in the stock.231
In contrast, the court then noted that all joint tenants must join
in the endorsement of an entire interest.232 The court further observed, however, that the drafters of the U.C.C. anticipated that,
under certain circumstances, a joint tenant could transfer or assign
less than a whole interest in investment securities.233 As a result,
the court held that the transfer would be effective to the extent of
the endorsement and that Robert Walsh effectively had pledged a
security interest in his undivided one-half interest in the stock. 3
In a concurring opinion, Justice Heiple presented an alternative
rationale for the decision.235 Justice Heiple suggested that the majority's reliance on the U.C.C. was misplaced because the U.C.C.
does not deal with the right to transfer or pledge a security interest
when less than all of the interest holders sign the transfer.236 He
further noted that the U.C.C. fails to resolve the situation where, in
an attempt to pledge an entire security, a joint tenant signs the
229. Id. at 690-91, 489 N.E.2d at 338. The circuit court granted a preliminary injunction against the sale and certified the case for interlocutory appeal. Id. The circuit
court premised its decision on section 8-308 of the U.C.C. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
26, para. 8-308 (1985)). The court interpreted "appropriate person" in section 8-308(1)
and concluded that Robert alone was not an appropriate person to create any security
interest in favor of the bank but noted the signatures of both joint tenants were necessary.
Accordingly, the court held that the bank had no enforceable security interest and could
not force a sale of even Robert's individual one-half interest. Id.
230. Walsh, 140 I11.App. 3d at 692, 489 N.E.2d at 339.
231. Id. (citing Ogilvie v. Idaho Bank and Trust Co., 99 Idaho 361, 582 P.2d 215
(1978)). In Ogilvie, the Idaho Supreme Court considered a similar factual situation and
held that an undivided interest in investment securities was capable of being pledged. The
Walsh court criticized the circuit court and the dissenting opinion in Ogilvie for their
reliance on section 8-308 of the U.C.C. Walsh, 140 Ill. App. 3d at 691, 489 N.E.2d at
339.
232. Walsh, 140 Ill. App. 3d at 691, 489 N.E.2d at 339.
233. Id. at 691-92, 489 N.E.2d at 339.
234. Id. at 692, 489 N.E.2d at 339 (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, para. 8-308(5)
(1985)).
235. Walsh, 140 Ill. App. 3d at 689, 692, 489 N.E.2d at 339 (Heiple, J., concurring).
236. Id.
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transfer himself and also fraudulently forges another joint tenant's
signature.2 37 Interestingly, Justice Heiple relied on the decision in
Harms v. Sprague238 to conclude that a mortgage by a joint tenant
exists as a lien on his interest in the joint tenancy property while he
is living but that the lien does not sever the joint tenancy and,
therefore, is extinguished upon his death.23 9 Applying that principle to Walsh, Justice Heiple recognized the validity of Robert's
pledge on his own signature of an undivided one-half interest in the
stock.24
241
C. Secured Transactions

During the Survey year, Illinois case law in the area of secured
transactions primarily reemphasized already standing Illinios Law.
One Illinois Supreme Court decision, however, did clarify the principle of waiver of security interests. At the appellate court level,
one case is significant for its treatment of beneficial interests in land
trusts, and another for its application of the U.C.C. Those decisions are reviewed in this section.
In Sexton v. Smith,242 the Illinois Supreme Court held that a
party effectively waives a prior security interest in a chattel by voluntarily agreeing to allow a bank to acquire a preferred claim. The
237. Id. at 692, 489 N.E.2d at 339-40 (Heiple, J., concurring).
238. 105 Ill. 2d 215, 473 N.E.2d 930 (1984).
239. Walsh, 140 Ill. App. 3d at 693, 489 N.E.2d at 340 (Heiple, J., concurring).
240. Id.
241. Cases involving creditors' rights and homestead exemptions and fraudulent
conveyances also are relevant to a review of commercial transactions cases. Two cases
decided during the Survey period examined creditors' rights and homestead exemptions.
See Bank of Illmo v. Simmons, 142 Ill. App. 3d 741, 492 N.E.2d 207 (5th Dist. 1986)
(amended homestead exemption statute in effect at the time of a judgment foreclosing on
a trust deed, as applied to remedy of judgment creditor for collection of a debt, entitled to
retroactive application to the date of execution because it did not result in an unjustified
impairment of the creditor's rights); Willard v. Northwest National Bank of Chicago, 137
Ill. App. 3d 255, 484 N.E.2d 823 (1st Dist. 1985) (homestead exemption benefits not only
the householder, but the family, and affords the householder's spouse a veto-like power
where alienation or encumberance of the homestead are concerned).
Three Illinois decisions examined fraudulent conveyances. See People ex rel. Hartigan
v. Gaby's Apparel, 113 Ill. App. 3d 343, 478 N.E.2d 1043 (1st Dist. 1985) (security
agreement executed between president of a corporation and close friend constituted a
fraudulent conveyance); Kardynalski v. Fisher, 135 Ill. App. 3d 643, 482 N.E.2d 117 (2d
Dist. 1985) (defendant's conveyance in an attempt to avoid liability for worker's
compensation claim was fraud-in-law); Superior Partners v. Professional Education
Network, 138 Ill. App. 3d 226, 485 N.E.2d 1218 (1st Dist. 1985) (Illinois rule that a
transfer of personal property, unaccompanied by a corresponding change of possession, is
fraudulent per se and void as to creditors and subsequent bona fide purchasers does not
apply to those who have prior notice of the sale).
242. 112 Ill. 2d 187, 492 N.E.2d 1284 (1986).
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plaintiff in Sexton agreed to sell his farm and the cattle and machinery located on the farm to Hampton. Riedemann, the president of the Bradford National Bank, offered to finance the sale of
the cattle and machinery on the condition that Sexton and Hampton arranged for financing the sale of the farm. Riedemann testified
that he told both Sexton and Hampton that the bank would require
proper security.243
Later the same month, Smith, representing Sexton, prepared a
contract, deed, and escrow agreement for the sale of the property.
The contract provided for a $50,000 down payment by Hampton
with the balance payable in installments over a twenty-five year
period. Under the contract, Sexton retained title to the property
until final payment was made, though Hampton could take possession of the property and commence farm operations the day the
contract was executed. 2" In order to finance the purchase of the
farm, Hampton obtained a $44,600 loan from Bradford National
Bank and signed a note, a security agreement, and a financing
statement giving the bank a first lien on the cattle and
machinery.245
Subsequently, Hampton defaulted on the note and Bradford National Bank sought to enforce its lien. Judgment was entered in
favor of the bank.246 As a result, Sexton brought an action for malpractice against Smith alleging that Smith failed to protect his security interest in the cattle and machinery. The trial court ruled in
favor of Sexton. 247 This decision was affirmed on appeal. The appellate court then granted Smith's petition for leave to appeal.248
On appeal, Smith argued that Sexton voluntarily waived his security interest and thereby relieved Smith of any malpractice liability.24 9 The court agreed. 25° The court looked to Article 9 of the
243. Id. at 189-90, 492 N.E.2d at 1285.
244. Id. at 190, 492 N.E.2d at 1285. The record did not indicate that any discussion
transpired regarding Sexton's retaining a security interest in the cattle and machinery.
The following month, Hampton paid Sexton $50,000. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 189, 492 N.E.2d at 1285.
248. Id. at 192, 492 N.E.2d at 1286. The trial court found that Smith was negligent
in failing to file a financing statement which would protect Sexton's security interest in
the cattle and machinery and thus entered judgment in favor of Sexton. The court also
determined that Sexton had not agreed to the bank's taking a prior security interest in the
property. Thus, Smith was the proximate cause of Sexton's loss of a secured interest. A
divided panel of the appellate court issued a Rule 23 opinion affirming the trial court.
The Illinois Supreme Court then granted Smith's petition for leave to appeal. Id.
249. Id. at 193, 492 N.E.2d at 1287.
250. Id. (citing Pelham v. Griesheimer, 92 Ill. 2d 13, 440 N.E.2d 96 (1982); Cook v.
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U.C.C. which provides for the creation of security interests in personal property or fixtures.2 5 1 In interpreting the Article, the court
stressed the importance of filing a financial statement" 2 and further noted that Article 9 is intended to protect a creditor's interest
in secured property and place others on notice of possible adverse
claims against the property. 3 Notwithstanding that purpose, the
court ruled that a creditor may waive his right to a security interest.254 The court then concluded that the plaintiff waived his prior
security interest in the cattle and machinery by voluntarily agreeing to the bank's acquisition of a preferred claim.255
Sexton argued that section 9-105 (1)(d) of the U.C.C. 25 6 requires
a third party to sign both a security agreement and a financing
statement. The Sexton court agreed that absence of a third party
owner's signature may be evidence of a lack of waiver, but nevertheless held that the facts convincingly showed that Sexton had
waived his security interest in favor of the bank. 7
At the appellate level, two significant secured transactions cases
were decided. In Commercial National Bank of Chicago v. Hazel

Manor Condominiums, Inc. ,258 the Illinois Appellate Court for the
First District resolved any uncertainty concerning the nature of a
beneficial interest in a land trust. 59 In CommercialNationalBank,
Gould, 109 Ill. App. 3d 311, 440 N.E.2d 448 (3d Dist. 1982); Brown v. Gitlin, 19 Ill.
App. 3d 1018, 313 N.E.2d 180 (1st Dist. 1974)). The trial court indicated that "the
plaintiff must prove that the defendant attorney owed plaintiff a duty of due care arising
from the attorney-client relationship, that the defendant breached that duty, and that as a
proximate result, the plaintiff suffered injury." Id.
251. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, para. 9-102(a) (1985)).
252. Sexton, 112 Ill. 2d at 193, 492 N.E.2d at 1287.
253. Id.
254. Id. (quoting Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Brochu, 105 Ill. 2d 486, 475
N.E.2d 872 (1985); Vermilion County Production Credit Association v. Izzard, 111 11.
App. 3d 190, 249 N.E.2d 352 (4th Dist. 1969)). The supreme court defined waiver as an
"intentional relinquishment of a known right" and further observed that waiver can be
"express or implied, and arise from acts, words or conduct of the one waiving the right."
Id.
255. Sexton, 112 Ill. 2d at 194-95, 492 N.E.2d at 1287-88. The court also applied the
long-established axiom that a reviewing court will not disturb the finding of the trial
court unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In reaching the determination, the court relied extensively on witness testimony. Testimony that Sexton knew the
necessity of the bank's acquisition of a lien on the property and that he voluntarily relinquished his security interest in favor of the bank greatly influenced the outcome of the
case. Id.
256. Id. at 195, 492 N.E.2d at 1288 (citing ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 26, para. 9-112,
Illinois Code Comment, at 91 (Smith-Hurd 1974); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, para. 9-105
(l)(d) (1985)).
257. Sexton, 112 Il. 2d at 196, 492 N.E.2d at 1288.
258. 139 Ill. App. 3d 644, 487 N.E.2d 1145 (1st Dist. 1985).
259. Id.
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the court held that a beneficial interest in a land trust constituted a
personal property interest and not an interest in real estate.26°
The dispute in Commercial NationalBank arose after four individuals 26 entered into a joint venture agreement for the purchase
of an apartment building. They subsequently incorporated the
building in Illinois as Hazel Manor Condominiums, Inc. Following the execution of a trust agreement, the company conveyed title
to the property to the Commercial National Bank of Chicago. As
trustee, the bank held one hundred percent of the beneficial interest
in the land trust. Two of the company's shareholders retained the
power of direction. Commercial National Bank, in its individual
capacity, agreed to make various loans to itself as trustee for the
trust. The loans were secured by trust deeds and the trustee's collateral assignments of the beneficial interest in the trust. Also, demand notes evidenced the loans.262
Subsequently, the defendants defaulted on the notes. The bank
voluntarily agreed not to foreclose on the properties or to pursue
its remedies under the U.C.C. after the defendants agreed to sell
the property and satisfy the debts. The defendants failed to consummate a sale and consequently the bank attempted to foreclose.
The bank published a notice of public sale of the beneficial interest
prior to the foreclosure action and the defendants petitioned to enjoin the sale.263 The trial court denied the petition and the bank
sold the collateral.2 6 On appeal, the defendants sought to have the
U.C.C. sale voided. They contended that the trial court denied
them their rights under the Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Act by
failing to recognize the equitable mortgage nature of the collateral
assignment.265
260. Id. at 647-48, 487 N.E.2d at 1148.
261. Id. at 645, 487 N.E.2d at 1146. The four individuals involved were Thomas and
Nancy Lee Joyce and Arnold and Wilma Anderson. The Joyces, in addition to Hazel
Manor Condominiums, were named as defendants. The Joyces owned and controlled
one-half of the corporation's stock, and the Andersons owned and controlled the other
half. Id.
262. Id. at 645, 487 N.E.2d at 1146-47. The notes also were secured by assignments
of the beneficial interests in other land trusts. Id.
263. Id. The trial court denied the petition. The bank postponed the sale while the
defendants took an interlocutory appeal seeking a reversal and an order voiding the sale.
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision. Id.
264. Id. at 646, 487 N.E.2d at 1147.
265. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 15-001 (1985)). The defendants also
argued that the bank's prior election to institute foreclosure proceedings precluded them
from denying the existence of an equitable mortgage. Further, they contended that they
were entitled to a judicial foreclosure of the real estate because of the real estate mortgages on the property. Id.
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The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision.2 66 The
court stated that a lien upon the beneficial interest in a land trust
267
generally does not constitute a lien upon the real estate itself.
Therefore, the court ruled that the assignment of a beneficial interest to secure a note did not convert the property into real estate
and thereby permit the right of redemption.268 The court noted
that the Illinois Supreme Court previously had held that a security
interest in a beneficial interest in a land trust was personal property.2 69 To determine the nature of a particular interest, the previous court garnered the intent of the parties from the trust
agreements.27 °
Applying a similar analysis, the appellate court made several observations. First, the court noted that the defendants executed the
notes after the creation of the land trust.271 Second, the assignments of the beneficial interests in other land trusts secured the
payment of the notes,2 72 a fact which supported the plaintiff's contention that the assignments were distinct from the creation of the
trust. The court then asserted that the language in the collateral
assignment was most critical.273 Accordingly, the court observed
that the language specifically stated that, upon default, the secured
274
lender possessed the rights of a secured party under the U.C.C.

Moreover, the court noted that the trust agreement did not provide
for the sale of the real estate upon default. 275 Based upon the
aforementioned findings, 276 the court concluded that the security
arrangements were personal property interests and that the bank
validly sold the collateral without instituting judicial foreclosure
266.

Commercial National Bank, 139 I1. App. 3d at 646, 487 N.E.2d at 1147.

267.

Id.

268. Id. (citing Melrose Park National Bank v. Melrose Park National Bank, 123 Ill.
App. 3d 282, 285-86, 462 N.E.2d 741 (1st Dist. 1984); American National Bank & Trust
Co. v. Ryan, 106 Ill. App. 3d 434, 436 N.E.2d 37 (1st Dist. 1982)).
269. Commercial National Bank, 139 Ill. App. 3d at 646-47, 487 N.E.2d at 1147
(citing Homey v. Hayes, 11 Ill. 2d 178, 142 N.E.2d 94 (1957)).
270. Commercial National Bank, 139 Ill. App. 3d at 647, 487 N.E.2d at 1147-48
(citing Melrose Park, 123 Ill. App. 3d at 287, 462 N.E.2d at 744). In Homey, the court
considered (1) whether the land trust was created merely as security for a debt, (2)
whether the assignment of the beneficial interest occurred subsequent to the creation of
the trust, (3) whether the beneficial interest had been pledged as security, and (4) whether
the trust agreement provided for the sale of the real estate upon default.
271. Commercial National Bank, 139 Ill. App. 3d at 647, 487 N.E.2d at 1148.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 648, 487 N.E.2d at 1148.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 647-48, 487 N.E.2d at 1148. The record was ambiguous as to whether the
trust was created for the sole purpose of securing loans. Id.
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proceedings.277
Another significant secured transactions case involved applications of the U.C.C.. In Executive Commercial Services, Ltd. v. Va278 the Illinois Appellate Court for the First
por Corporation,
District held that a creditor is not barred from recovering a deficiency from a debtor when the creditor fails to notify the debtor of
the collateral's sale. In Executive CommercialServices, the plaintiff
creditor sold collateral without notice to the defendant debtor after
default. The creditor then sought a deficiency judgment to recover
the difference between the debt and the proceeds from the sale.
The trial court granted the defendant debtor's motion for summary
79
2

judgment.

On appeal, the appellate court ruled that the trial court erred in
granting the debtor's motion for summary judgment and remanded
the case for a determination of whether the sale was commercially
reasonable. 2 0 The court acknowledged that Section 9-504 of the
U.C.C. controls the right of a secured party to dispose of collateral
after default. 28 1 The court, however, stated that a creditor may sell
the collateral after default, providing that the sale is commercially
reasonable and that the debtor has reasonable notice of the sale.282
The court continued its analysis by considering an earlier Illinois
Supreme Court decision. 283 The court interpreted that decision to
mean that lack of notice to the debtor does not operate as an automatic bar to recovering a deficiency from the debtor.28 4 Though
there is a presumption that the value of the collateral sold is equal
to the indebtedness, the court held that the creditor may rebut that
277. Id. at 648-49, 487 N.E.2d at 1148-49. The appellate court also indicated that
the plaintiff had not waived its right to relief under the U.C.C. by admitting that the
assignment of the beneficial interest was a real estate mortgage. Id. (citing Melrose Park,
123 Ill. App. 3d at 289, 462 N.E.2d at 744). The court dismissed the defendants' argument that "the co-existence of real estate mortgages on the subject property entitle[d]
them to judicial foreclosure proceedings, regardless of the nature of the security interests
at issue." Id. The defendants cited no authority in support of this contention. Id.
278. 134 Il1. App. 3d 558, 481 N.E.2d 16 (1st Dist. 1985).
279. Id. at 559, 481 N.E.2d at 17. The trial court granted the defendants' motion
based on the "absolute bar" view which precludes a secured creditor from bringing a
deficiency action against the debtor unless the debtor was given notice of the proposed
sale of collateral. Id. at 560, 481 N.E.2d at 17.
280. Id. at 562, 481 N.E.2d at 19.
281. Id. at 560, 481 N.E.2d at 17 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, para. 9-504 (1985)).
282. Executive Commercial Services, 134 Ill. App. 3d at 560, 481 N.E.2d at 17-18
(citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, para. 9-504(3) (1985)).
283. Executive Commercial Service, 134 Ill. App. 3d at 562, 481 N.E.2d at 19 (citing
First Galesburg National Bank & Trust Co. v. Joannides, 103 Ill. 2d 294, 299, 469
N.E.2d 180, 182 (1984)).
284. Executive Commercial Services, 134 Ill. App. 3d at 562, 481 N.E.2d at 19.
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presumption by showing that the value of the collateral was less
than the indebtedness and that the sale was commercially reasonable.28 5 Thus, the court remanded the case for
a finding of whether
28 6
the collateral was worth less than the debt.
V.

A.

CONTRACTS

287

Contract Formation

At the appellate court level, two Illinois contract formation
cases expanded the law of contracts. In Board of Directorsof Carriage Way Property Owners Association v. Western NationalBank of
Cicero,2 s s the court held that it would neither imply a contractual
duty to pay for the maintenance, nor render a quasi-contractual
obligation to pay the assessments although the defendant apartment owners received a benefit from the maintenance of the common areas. 289 The board imposed common assessments against the
owners which were not paid. As a result, the board instituted an
action to recover the payments due.29 °
On appeal, the court stated that an implied promise to pay for
services exists only when the performing party entertains a reasonable expectation of payment by the benefitted party. 291 The Carriage Way court ruled that the plaintiff could not have entertained
a reasonable expectation of remuneration for their continued rendering of services because the defendants clearly expressed dissent
285. Id. at 561, 481 N.E.2d at 18.
286. Id. at 562, 481 N.E.2d at 19.
287. The law governing sales contracts remained virtually unchanged throughout the
Survey period. The Illinois Supreme Court did not decide any cases developing sales
contract law. Furthermore, few of the appellate court decisions addressing sales contract
disputes advanced the law of sales contracts. Three sales contract appellate decisions,
however, do present timely issues. See Rebaque v. Forsythe Racing, Inc. 134 Il. App. 3d
778, 480 N.E.2d 1338 (1st Dist. 1985) (buyer's counterclaim for a set-off limited to claims
arising out of same contract); Shippey v. Traub, 138 Ill. App. 3d 434, 485 N.E.2d 1173
(3d Dist. 1985) (installment contract held voidable by the purchaser when seller failed to
comply with the statutory requirements concerning notification of building code
violations); Bodine Sewer, Inc. v. Eastern Illinois Precast, Inc., 143 Ill. App. 3d 920, 493
N.E.2d 705 (4th Dist. 1986) (express warranty prevailed over inconspicuous disclaimer
notwithstanding alleged exclusion of all warranties by the custom of the concrete pipe
trade).
288. 139 Ill. App. 3d 542, 487 N.E.2d 974 (1st Dist. 1985).
289. Id. at 547-49, 487 N.E.2d at 978-79. The defendants included Western National
Bank, as trustee under a trust, Carriage Way Apartments, an Illinois general partnership,
and unkown individual owners. Id. at 544, 487 N.E.2d at 976.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 547, 487 N.E.2d at 978 (citing Pope v. Speiser, 7 Ill. 2d 231, 237-38, 130
N.E.2d 507, 510 (1955)).
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by refusing to pay.29 2 As such, the court held that an implied contract did not exist.293
The plaintiff also argued that the defendants had a quasi-contractual duty to pay for the maintenance of the common areas. The
court rejected this argument and determined that the plaintiff's
voluntary maintenance of the common areas in spite of the defendants' timely refusal to pay did not render the defendants unjustly
enriched. 294 The court asserted that the mere retention of a benefit
was insufficient to require restitution. Thus, because the court
found no unjust enrichment, the plaintiff could not recover under a
quasi-contract theory.295
Another decision of the Illinois Appellate Court for the First
District dismissed a contract action for $.83 after establishing the
existence of an enforceable contract. 296 The plaintiffs in Fineman
v. Citicorp, held Mastercards issued by the defendants Citicorp and
Citibank. The Citibank Retail Installment Credit Agreement governed the use of the cards. 297 The agreement provided that Citibank could change the finance charge at any time and that failure
to return a written rejection of the new terms within thirty days
constituted acceptance of the changes.
The plaintiffs subsequently received notice of an increase in the
annual rate. This notice included a description of additional services available to those who paid the increased fee. One of those
additional services was "free $100,000 common carrier travel insurance."29 The notice also contained a clause similar to that in
the Retail Installment Credit Agreement regarding rejection of the
terms.299 When Citibank received no written rejection of the terms
292. Carriage Way, 139 Ill. App. 3d at 547, 487 N.E.2d at 978.
293. Id. at 548-49, 487 N.E.2d at 979.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 548, 487 N.E.2d at 978 (citing Rutledge v. Housing Authority of the City
of East St. Louis, 88 Ill. App. 3d 1064, 1069, 411 N.E.2d 82, 86 (5th Dist. 1980)).
296. Fineman v. Citicorp, 137 Ill. App. 3d 1035, 1039, 485 N.E.2d 591, 593 (1st Dist.
1985).
297. Id. at 1037, 485 N.E.2d at 592. The credit agreement provided in relevant part:
Amendment. We can change this Agreement including thefinance charge and
the annual percentage rate at any time. However, if we do we will mail you
written notice at least 30 days before the beginning of the billing cycle in which
the changes becomes effective. If you do not agree to the changes, you must
notify us in writing and return the card cut in half within 30 days and pay us
the balance ....Otherwise we will understand that you agree to the changes in
the notice.
Id. (emphasis in original).
298. Id. at 1038, 485 N.E.2d at 592.
299. Id. The clause in the notice stated:
If you do not wish to agree to the new terms you must notify us in writing by
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from the Finemans, it subtracted $.83 from their credit balance as
payment for the prorated portion of the increase in the annual
fee." °° The plaintiffs then instituted the action for recovery of the
$.83 based upon three theories. First, the plaintiffs argued that Citibank offered no consideration for the modification. Second, the
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants engaged in deceptive practices
in order to induce them to accept the modifications. And third, the
plaintiffs contended that construing silence as acceptance violated
the common law of contracts. 31 The trial court dismissed all three
counts.302

On appeal, the appellate court affirmed.30 3 The court reiterated
the well-established principle that a hindsight determination of
how the parties fare under the contract does not bear upon the
adequacy of consideration. 3° Instead, adequacy of consideration
must be evaluated as of the time of contract.30 5 Thus, failure to
receive insurance benefits did not render the insurance inadequate
consideration for the modification.306 Further, the court commented that the adequacy of consideration does not generally merit
review unless the amount appears grossly inadequate and shocks
the conscience of the court.30 7 The court determined that in this
situation the parties engaged in a fair bargain, and that the exchange of two months of $100,000 of common carrier travel insurance coverage for $.83 did not shock the conscience of the court.
In rejecting the plaintiffs' claim that the defendants employed deceptive practices to induce acceptance of the modification, the
court enumerated three reasons. First, the court concluded that
the use of the word "free" to describe the travel insurance did not
establish a deceptive trade practice because the notice clearly
stated that the insurance was available only to those cardholders
March 2, 1982 [effective date of the increase] ....

You can continue using your

cards under the existing terms until the expiration date printed on your cards,
even if you do notify us that you do not agree to the new terms.
Id. (emphasis in original).
300. Id.
301. Id. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint and the plaintiffs appealed. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 1039, 485 N.E.2d at 593.
304. Id.
305. Id. (quoting Bonner v. Westbound Records, Inc., 76 Ill. App. 3d 736, 743, 394
N.E.2d 1303, 1308 (1st Dist. 1979)).
306. Fineman, 137 Ill. App. 3d at 1039, 485 N.E.2d at 593.
307. Id. (citing Bonner v. Westbound Records, Inc., 76 Ill. App. 3d 736, 743, 394
N.E.2d 1303, 1308 (lst Dist. 1979)).
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paying the higher fee. 08 Second, the court found that the defendants' omission of many material facts from the brochure describing
the insurance did not render the brochure deceptive or confusing.3"9 Third, the court indicated that the failure to state that the
insurance remained available during the annual renewal period did
not constitute a deceptive practice. The court noted that the defendants had no obligation to renew the credit cards after their
expiration dates if, as cardholders they properly refused to pay the
increased fee.3"' Finally, the Fineman court rejected the plaintiffs'
contention that construing silence as acceptance violated the common law of contracts.31 '
B.

Contract Construction

Construction of restrictive covenants continues to be an unsettled area of contract law." E One Illinois appellate court decision
308. Fineman, 137 Ill. App. 3d at 1041, 485 N.E.2d at 594. In reaching this conclusion, the court cited the Federal Trade Commission's leading case on the word "free" in
advertising:
The use of the word "Free" . . . [is] an unfair or deceptive act or practice under
the following circumstances: (1) When all of the conditions, obligations, or
other prerequisites of the receipt and retention of the 'free' article, the offerer
either (A) increases the ordinary and usual price; or (B) reduces the quality; or
(C) reduces the quantity or size of such article of merchandise.
Id. at 1040-41, 485 N.E.2d at 599. (citing Walter J. Black, Inc. Trading as the Classics
Club & Detective Book Club, 50 F.T.C. 225, 235-36 (1953)).
309. Fineman, 137 Ill. App. 3d at 1041, 485 N.E.2d at 594 (quoting ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 1211/2, para. 262 (1981)). The Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices
Act states in relevant part:
unfair or deceptive acts or practices, including but not limited to the use or
employment of any deception,... misrepresentation or the... omission of any
material fact, with intent that others rely upon the... omission of such material
fact, or the use or employment of any practice described in Section 2 of the
'Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act,' . . . in the conduct of any trade or
commerce are hereby declared unlawful.... In construing this section, consideration shall be given to the interpretations of the Federal Trade Commission
and the federal courts relating to Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission
Act.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1211/2, para. 262 (1985). Section two of the Uniform Deceptive
Trade Practices Act defines deceptive business practice as including any action taken in
the course of business which "(2) causes likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding
as to the source, sponsorship, approval or certification of goods or services; [or] . . . (12)
... similarly creates a likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding." ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 121 1/2, para. 312 (1985).
310. Fineman, 137 Ill. App. 3d at 1041-42, 485 N.E.2d at 594.
311. Id.
312. One contract construction case meriting mention is American Family Life Assurance Co. v. Tazelaar, 135 Ill. App. 3d 1069, 482 N.E.2d 1072 (1st Dist. 1985). In
Tazelaar,the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District refused to enforce a covenant
not to compete because it lacked a territorial restriction. Id. at 1073, 482 N.E.2d at 1075.
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considered restrictive covenants without geographical limitations.
In McRand, Inc. v. van Beelen,31 a the Illinois Appellate Court for
the First District enforced a restrictive covenant which lacked a
geographical limitation. The restrictive covenant in McRand prohibited an employee, van Beelen, from soliciting past or current
McRand clients for a period of two years following his termination. Additionally, the covenant restricted van Beelen from soliciting business from prospective McRand customers for a period of
one year if van Beelen recorded business development time for the
customer.3" 4 McRand designed and coordinated management and
incentive award programs for major corporations and businesses. 315 Prior to any booking, each major account took one to
three years and approximately $200,000 to develop. 3 6 The company also maintained continued business relations with its cliThe Tazelaarcourt applied Georgia law because the plaintiff life insurance company had
its home office in Georgia. The contract at issue in Tazelaar contained a severability
clause and stated that Georgia law governed the agreement. The noncompetition clauses
at issue provided that the employee would not "within the geographic area where [he
had] sold and serviced policies for American ... (1) [a]ttempt to induce other [employees] or sales agents of American Family to terminate their agreement with American
Family or to become contracted or associated with another insurance company ... [ or]
...(2) [a]ttempt to induce policyholders or accounts of American Family to relinquish
their policies . . . " Id. at 1070-71, 482 N.E.2d at 1073-74. The court held the clauses

void for lack of any territorial limitation. Id. at 1073, 482 N.E.2d at 1075. The court
further stated that while a covenant not to compete or solicit must only restrict an employee from soliciting those customers he actually served while employed. Lack of an
express territorial restriction automatically invalidated the covenant. Id. at 1072-73, 482
N.E.2d at 1075. In Tazelaar, even though each defendant had a specific sales territory,
the covenant did not expressly restrict solicitation within those specific areas. Therefore,
the covenant was impermissibly vague and unenforceable. Id. at 1073, 482 N.E.2d at
1075.
313. 138 Ill. App. 3d 1045, 1057, 486 N.E.2d 1306, 1315 (1st Dist. 1985). At issue in
McRand was a restrictive covenant that lacked a geographical limitation. The provision
stated in relevant part:
For a period of two years following his termination of employment, the employee shall not solicit business relating to the services or products of the kind
generally rendered or furnished by McRand ... or render or furnish such services and products to any of McRand's past or current clients for which McRand
or its employees have rendered services billed to any such client at any time
during the two-year period immediately prior to his termination of employment. For a period of one year following his termination of employment, the
employee shall not solicit business from any of McRand's prospective accounts
for which he has, during the two-year period immediately prior to his termination of employment, recorded business development time.
Id. at 1049, 486 N.E.2d at 1309-10.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 1047, 486 N.E.2d at 1309. McRand was a Delaware corporation licensed
to do business in Illinois. Id.
316. Id. at 1048, 486 N.E.2d at 1309.
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ents.31 7 The dispute in McRand emerged after two McRand
employees, van Beelen and Nelson, resigned from McRand and
started their own business, Gravel International Corporation.318
Gravel directly competed with McRand and serviced McRand customers.3" 9 McRand brought an action for injunctive relief against
van Beelen, Nelson, and Gravel International Corporation seeking
to enforce the restrictive covenants in the employment agreement.
The trial court denied McRand's motion for a preliminary
injunction.32 °
On appeal, the court stated that the propriety of granting injunctive relief depended upon the enforceability of the restrictive covenant.321 The court also observed that the enforceability of the
restrictive covenant depended upon the existence of a protectable
interest and upon whether the covenant was reasonably related to
safeguarding that interest.3 2
In reaching the conclusion that McRand had a protectable interest, 323 the appellate court applied a two-prong test. 324 First, the
court considered whether the employer maintained a near-permanent relationship with its customers. 325 Next, the court examined
whether the employee would have had contact with the customers
but for the employment.326 The court considered numerous factors
in evaluating whether a near-permanent relationship existed: the
number of years it took McRand to develop its clientele 327 the
317. Id.
318. Id. Van Beelen had held the positions of vice-president, stockholder, and director of McRand. Nelson was a program manager and later a senior accounts manager.
Both employees had close contact with McRand customers and had detailed knowledge
of the customers' history, structure, organization, key decision makers, and specialized
needs and preferences. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 1050, 486 N.E.2d at 1310. The trial court advanced several reasons for
denying McRand's motion for a preliminary injunction. The trial court held that McRand lacked a protectable interest in its client relationships, that McRand had not suffered an irreparable injury, and that McRand had an adequate remedy at law. The court
also noted that the agreements were unenforceable because the terms were unreasonable
and lacked a geographic scope limitation. Moreover, there was no evidence of actual
solicitation of McRand's customers by defendants. Lastly, the court concluded that the
agreements were not supported by consideration and were contracts of adhesion. Id.
321. Id. at 1051, 486 N.E.2d at 1311 (citing Booth v. Greber, 48 Ill. App. 3d 213, 363
N.E.2d 6 (1st Dist. 1977)).
322. McRand, 138 Ill. App. 3d at 1051, 1056, 486 N.E.2d at 1311, 1314.
323. Id. at 1054, 486 N.E.2d at 1313.
324. Id. at 1051, 486 N.E.2d at 1311.
325. Id.
326. Id. (citing Cockerill v. Wilson, 51111. 2d 179, 281 N.E.2d 648 (1972); Canfield v.
Spear, 44 11. 2d 49, 254 N.E.2d 433 (1969)).
327. McRand, 138 Ill. App. 3d at 1051, 486 N.E.2d at 1311. Because it took approxi-
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amount of money invested in developing a clientele,328 the level of
difficulty involved in developing clientele,329 the amount of personal customer contact by van Beelen and Nelson,33 ° the extent of
their knowledge of McRand clients,331 the length of time customers
were associated with McRand, aa2 and the continuity of the relationship with the customer.333 Weighing these factors, the court
concluded that McRand maintained a near-permanent relationship
with its customers. 334 The court further ruled that McRand fulfilled the second prong of the test 335 because McRand had provided

van Beelen and Nelson with the opportunity to develop close contacts with its customers and because neither employee had any experience in designing award incentive programs prior to working
for McRand.336
The appellate court also determined that the restrictions were
necessary to protect McRand's interest and reversed the trial
court's finding that lack of geographic restriction made this covenant unenforceable. 3 37 The McRand court held that covenants

containing no geographic limitation are valid "if their purpose is to
protect an employer from losing clients to a former employee who
gains special knowledge of the client's needs while employed. '338
Thus, the court stated that the covenant constituted an "activity
mately three years to develop the clientele, the court determined that this was an indication of a near-permanent relationship. Id.
328. Id. at 1052, 486 N.E.2d at 1311. With each client costing approximately
$200,000, the amount of money invested revealed near-permanent customer relations. Id.
329. Id. The court observed that the development of clientele was complex and important to sustaining business. Accordingly, the court determined it was indicative of a
near-permanent client-company relationship. Id.
330. Id. The court noted that van Beelen and Nelson worked closely with customers
and McRand emphasized such close working relationships. Id.
331. Id. The court observed that van Beelen and Nelson each had detailed knowledge of McRand customers. Id.
332. Id. at 1053, 486 N.E.2d at 1312. The court considered the length of time McRand had been in business in addition to the number of contracts McRand had with a
client over the relevant time period. The court concluded that McRand fulfilled this
consideration. Id.
333. Id. The court determined that McRand's major customers brought their busi-

ness to McRand on a regular basis. Hence, the court considered this indicative of a nearpermanent relationship. Id.
334.

Id.

335. Id. at 1053-54, 486 N.E.2d at 1312-13.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 1057, 486 N.E.2d at 1315.
338. Id. (citing Lawter International, Inc. v. Carroll, 116 Ill. App. 3d 717, 451
N.E.2d 1338 (1st Dist. 1983); J.D. Marshall, Inc. v. Fradkin, 87 Ill. App. 3d 118, 409
N.E.2d 4 (1st Dist. 1980); Wolf& Co. v. Waldron, 51 111. App. 3d 239, 366 N.E.2d 603
(1st Dist. 1977)).
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covenant," a covenant designed to protect the employer's relationships rather than to prohibit competition, and that the lack of geographical limitation did not make the covenant void as a matter of
law. Rather, the covenant evidenced an intent to protect McRand's customer relations wherever they existed. 33 9 Nonetheless,
the court warned that approval of an activity restriction requires
that the restriction reasonably relate to the employer's interest in
protecting the customer relations that its employees developed as a
direct result of employment. 34 Consequently, the court refused to
enforce that portion of the covenant which restricted activities beyond those involving the customers with whom van Beelen and
Nelson developed relationships. 341 Because the covenant terms
were severable, the court remanded the case to the trial court for
appropriate modification of the language in the activity
restriction.342
C.

343

Contract Remedies

During the Survey period, the Illinois Supreme Court considered
three cases involving contract remedies and damages. In Morrow v.
L.A. Goldschmidt Associates, Inc., a the Illinois Supreme Court
held that punitive damages are not recoverable for wilful and wanton breach of contract when plaintiffs allege only an economic loss.
339. McRand, 138 Ill.
App. 3d at 1057, 486 N.E.2d at 1315 (citing J.D. Marshall Inc.
v. Fradkin, 87 Ill. App. 3d 118, 409 N.E.2d 4 (1st Dist. 1980)).
340. McRand, 138 Ill. App. 3d at 1057-58, 486 N.E.2d at 1315 (citing Lawter International, Inc. v. Carroll, 116 Ill. App. 3d 717, 451 N.E.2d 1338 (1st Dist. 1983); Central
Keystone Plating of Illinois, Inc. v. Hutchison, 62 Ill. App. 2d 188, 210 N.E.2d 239 (4th
Dist. 1965)).
341. McRand, 138 Ill.
App. 3d at 1058, 486 N.E.2d at 1315-16.
342. Id. (citing Donald McElroy, Inc. v. Delaney, 72 Ill. App. 3d 285, 389 N.E.2d
1300 (1st Dist. 1979)). In addition to the issues considered in the text, the appellate court
also concluded that failure to grant a preliminary injunction would result in irreparable
injury to McRand and that McRand had no adequate remedy at law. McRand, 138 Ill.
App. 3d at 1055, 986 N.E.2d at 1313. Additionally, the court held that continued employment for a substantial period beyond the signing of the contract was sufficient consideration for the restrictive covenant. Id. Finally, the court did not consider the
employment agreement an adhesion contract. Id. at 1056, 986 N.E.2d at 1314.
343. One appellate court case not discussed in the text addressed the issue of specific
performance. It is relevant here only to the extent that it held that a condominium is real
property and a contract to purchase a condominium is subject to specific performance.
See Giannini v. First National Bank of Des Plaines, 136 Ill. App. 3d 971, 483 N.E.2d 924
(1st Dist. 1985). In Giannini,the fact that a newly constructed building containing the
subject unit had not been declared a condominium did not render the unit "nonexistent"
so as to preclude the purchaser's claim for specific performance of the agreement for the
purchase of the condominium unit in a specified building of the multi-building
condominium construction project. Id. at 989, 483 N.E.2d at 939.
344. 112 Ill. 2d 87, 492 N.E.2d 181 (1985).
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The plaintiffs in Morrow purchased four townhouses that were
designed, constructed, and sold by the defendants. Subsequent to
finding numerous defects in their townhouses, the plaintiffs named
four defendants in an action for damages for breach of warranty.
Three of the defendants were Leo A. Goldschmidt, a contractor
and developer, L.A. Goldschmidt Associates, Inc., a construction
corporation, and First Charter Service Corporation, a bank service
corporation. These defendants conveyed title to the real estate to a
fourth defendant, American National Bank, as trustee. The defendants, with the exception of American National Bank, formed
the Commons of Palos Park (the "Commons"). The Commons
planned, designed, and constructed the subject housing development. 345 At the time of each closing, the Commons expressly war-

ranted a leak-free roof, a waterproof basement, and plumbing
without defects.3 46 The warranty also provided that the Commons
would repair all structural defects caused by faulty construction
and/or defective materials during the warranty period if given notice of the defects by the homeowner. 347 The plaintiffs found sev-

eral defects in their townhomes which were never repaired.
Consequently, the plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking damages for
breach of both an express warranty and an implied warranty of
habitability. The plaintiffs also requested punitive damages.
The circuit court dismissed with prejudice several of the plaintiffs' counts and the plaintiffs appealed.34 The appellate court reversed and held that the plaintiffs had stated a cause of action.349
The Illinois Supreme Court allowed the defendants' petition for
leave to appeal.3 50
345. Id. at 90-92, 492 N.E.2d at 182.
346. Id. at 92, 492 N.E.2d at 182.
347. Id. The warranty period in the contract was one year. Id.
348. Id. at 90, 292 N.E.2d at 182.
349. Id. at 91, 292 N.E.2d at 182.
350. Id. The plaintiffs filed an eleven count complaint. Counts one through seven
concerned express and implied warranties. Those counts alleged improper floor support,
nonfunctioning reverse osmosis water system and defective carpentry work, basement
flooding, inoperative heating and cooling systems, an improperly installed sump pump,
and numerous other defects. Id. at 92-93, 492 N.E.2d at 182-83. Counts eight through
eleven requested punitive damages based on the defendants' inadequate supervision of the
construction of the plaintiff's homes; the knowing employment of incompetent contractors, subcontractors and agents; their wanton, wilful, and reckless failure to inspect the
homes; and their awareness of enumerated defects. Id. at 93-94, 492 N.E.2d at 183. The
circuit court dismissed counts eight through eleven with prejudice. The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of those counts, and the appellate court reversed, holding that the
counts stated a cause of action for willful and wanton misconduct and punitive damages.
The Illinois Supreme Court allowed the defendants' petition for leave to appeal. Id. at
90-91, 492 N.E.2d at 182.
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The Illinois Supreme Court responded to plaintiffs' claims by
holding that punitive damages are not recoverable for breach of
contract. 51 The court stated that the plaintiffs could not recover
352
punitiye damages absent an allegation of an independent tort.
Having so determined, the court cited Moorman Manufacturing
Co. v. National Tank Co. 353 and Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf,5 to support its adoption of the economic-loss doctrine. 3 " The Morrow
court stressed that contract law, rather than tort law, appropriately
governs recovery for solely economic losses.356 The court characterized the harm alleged in Morrow as a mere disappointed expectation that would be measured only by economic losses. 357 Because
tort claims were neither appropriate nor alleged, the court dismissed the counts requesting punitive damages.358
Finally, the court rejected the plaintiffs' attempt to distinguish
the case from Moorman and Redarowicz. 35 9 The plaintiffs argued
that the breach in Morrow was wilful and wanton whereas the
breaches in Moorman and Redarowicz were not. 3 ° Nonetheless,
351. Id. at 94, 492 N.E.2d at 183 (citing Bank of Lincolnwood v. Comdisco, Inc. 111
Ill. App. 3d 822, 829, 444 N.E.2d 657, 662 (1st Dist. 1982); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74
Ill. App. 3d 172, 187, 384 N.E.2d 353, 360 (1978); Hayes v. Moynihan, 52 Ill. 423, 426
(1869); 11 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1340 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1968); 5 A. CORBIN,
CONTRACTS § 1077 (1964); Note, PunitiveDamages in Contract Actions - Are the Exceptions Swallowing the Rule?, 20 WASHBURN L.J. 86 (1980); (RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS,

ch. 16 (introductory note) (1979)).

352. Morrow, 112 Ill. 2d at 95, 492 N.E.2d at 184 (citing McIntosh v. Magna Systems, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 1185 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (applying Illinois law); St. Ann's Home for
the Aged v. Daniels, 95 Ill. App. 3d 576, 420 N.E.2d 478 (1st Dist. 1981); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 355 (1981)). See also Bank of Lincolnwood v. Comdisco,

Inc., 111 111. App. 3d 822, 829, 444 N.E.2d 657, 662 (1st Dist. 1982) (punitive damages
are recoverable in breach of contract actions "where the breach amounts to an independent tort and there are proper allegations of malice, wantonness or oppression").
353. Morrow, 112 Ill. 2d at 96, 492 N.E.2d at 184. The Morrow court noted:
"[W]hen the defect is a qualitative nature and the harm relates to the consumer's expectation that a product is of a particular quality so that it is fit for ordinary use, contract,
rather than tort, law provides the appropriate set of rules for recovery." Id. at 96, 492
N.E.2d at 185 (citing Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 111. 2d 69,
88 435 N.E.2d 443 (1982).
354. Morrow, 112 Ill. 2d at 97, 492 N.E.2d at 185 (citing Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf,
92 Ill. 2d 171, 491 N.E.2d 329 (1982)). The court in Redarowicz held that the economic
loss-doctrine announced in Moorman applied when a homeowner sued a builder on the
theory that the builder was negligent in constructing the plaintiff's home. Redarowicz, 92
Ill. 2d at 171, 441 N.E. 2d at 324.
355. Morrow, 112 Ill. 2d at 96-97, 492 N.E.2d at 185-86.
356. Id. at 96, 492 N.E.2d at 185.
357. Id. at 98, 492 N.E.2d at 185 (quoting Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 92 Ill. 2d 171,
177, 441 N.E.2d 324, 327 (1982)).
358. Morrow, 112 Ill. 2d at 98, 492 N.E.2d at 185.
359. Id.
360. Id.
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the court stated that36 1a wilful and wanton breach of contract did
not establish a tort.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Goldenhersh 362 opined that the
plaintiffs in Morrow alleged facts of potentially life-threatening
structural defects and actions on the part of the defendants which
constituted a separate tort: wilful and wanton misconduct.363 Further, Justice Goldenhersh maintained that, even in the absence of
an allegation of a separate tort, the plaintiffs should have been364
able
to recover punitive damages based upon an alternative theory of
wilful and wanton breach of contract.365 Citing section 355 of Restatement Second of Contracts, he suggested that no rational reason existed for not discouraging wilful misconduct arising out of a
breach of contract in the same manner as wilful misconduct resulting in a tort.366
The Illinois Supreme Court addressed another contract damages
issue in Bates & Rogers Construction v. Greeley.367 The Bates court
held that the plaintiff subcontractors effectively waived their right
to recover delay damages under a contract. 36 Bates & Rogers suc-

cessfully bid on certain divisions of a construction project led by
the North Shore Sanitary District ("North Shore"). Two other
plaintiffs, Economy and Goldberg, subcontracted with Bates &
Rogers, but had no direct contract with the defendant North Shore
or with the defendant engineering firm, Greeley & Hansen. 369 The
contract between Bates & Rogers and North Shore contained an
exculpatory clause which barred Bates & Rogers from recovering
damages due to delays.

370

After defendant Greeley negligently

361. Id. (citing Hunter Douglas Metals, Inc. v. Edward C. Mange Trading Co., 586
F. Supp. 926, 929 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Tibbs v. National Homes Construction Corp., 52 Ohio
App. 2d 281, 290-91, 369 N.E.2d 1218, 1225 (1977)).
362. Morrow, 112 Ill. 2d at 99, 492 N.E.2d at 186 (Goldenhersh, J., dissenting).
363. Id. The dissenting opinion suggested that the plaintiffs had alleged an independent tort. Id.
364. Id.
365. Id. at 100, 492 N.E.2d at 186. (Goldenhersh, J., dissenting).
366. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, ch. 16 (introductory
note) (1979)).
367. 109 Ill. 2d 225, 486 N.E.2d 902 (1985).
368. Id. at 229, 486 N.E.2d at 904.
369. Id. at 227, 486 N.E.2d at 904.
370. Id. at 229, 486 N.E.2d at 905. The exculpatory clause provided:
The Contractor agrees to make no claim for damages for delay in the performance of this Contract occasioned by any act of omission to act of the District or
any of its representatives, or because of any injunction which may be brought
against the District or its representatives, and agrees that any such claim shall
be fully compensated for by an extension of time to complete performance of
the work as provided herein.
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failed to service electricity to the worksite for more than a year
after it was required, the plaintiffs filed suit to recover damages.
The plaintiffs contended that Greeley's negligence caused a disruption in the sequence of their work and ultimately resulted in cost
overruns and lost profits.37 ' North Shore settled with Bates &
Rogers, but the engineering firm and its individual partners refused
to settle the negligence claims against them.372
The Illinois Supreme Court granted the plaintiffs' petition for
leave to appeal. Thereafter, the court rejected the plaintiffs' cliam
for "delay damages. ' a3 Although the plaintiffs did not contract
with Greeley, they were nevertheless bound by North Shore's contract which barred them from recovering "delay damages.

37 4

The

court observed that the contract provisions extended to representatives of North Shore.375 Further, the court noted that the contractual definition of representative expressly included engineers, and
therefore, Greeley. a7 6 The court disagreed with the plaintiffs' argument that Greeley was not a third-party beneficiary to the contract,3 77 and explained that because the contract was intended to
confer a benefit upon Greeley, he qualified as a third-party
benefici3 78
ary protected by the no-damages-for-delay clause.

Finally, the court indicated that the exculpatory clause also
bound the two subcontractors.3 7

9

The court noted that the con-

tract between the plaintiffs and North Shore required the contractor to insert appropriate provisions of their contracts with North
Shore into their subcontracts. 38 0 Because the record did not in-

clude the subcontracts, the court presumed that the plaintiffs carried out their contractual duty to bind its subcontractors to the
terms of the main contract. 8 '
Another issue regarding recovery was addressed in the Illinois
Supreme Court decision of Lombard v. Elmore.as2 In Lombard,
the Illinois Supreme Court resolved a complex dispute in which the
Id.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.

Id. at 228-29, 486 N.E.2d at 904.
Id. at 228, 486 N.E.2d at 904.
Id. at 229, 486 N.E.2d at 904.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 232-33, 486 N.E.2d at 906.
Id.
Id. at 234-35, 486 N.E.2d at 906.
Id. at 235, 486 N.E.2d at 907.
Id.
Id.
112 Ill. 2d 467, 493 N.E.2d 1063 (1986).
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defendant relied upon identical facts both in seeking a set-off
against the plaintiffs' claim and in seeking damages for breach of
contract under a counterclaim. The court held
that this amounted
3 83
to a double recovery and denied the set-off.
The plaintiffs in Lombard formed a partnership with the defendant, Elmore, to operate a motel and banquet facility.384 The plaintiffs, also officers of a construction company, agreed with the
partnership to perform renovation work at the motel.385 After
making the agreement, the plaintiffs assigned their interests in the
partnership to the defendant.386 Under the assignment agreement,
each plaintiff received a $20,000 promissory note from the defendant, and was indemnified for any liabilities incurred by the operation of the partnership. The partnership paid the construction
company an outstanding balance of approximately $34,000 for
construction work on the motel. 87
The court consolidated the plaintiffs' separate actions for nonpayment of the promissory notes. In an affirmative defense, Elmore sought a set-off against the amount due on the promissory
notes, claiming that the plaintiffs only partially performed the assignment agreement.388 Additionally, the defendant filed a counterclaim seeking $74,851.45, for the plaintiffs' understatement of
the partnership accounts, $14,116.88 for the plaintiffs' misrepresentation of the construction costs, and $59,584.26, for the plaintiffs' failure to properly renovate the motel.389
The Illinois Supreme Court addressed two separate issues before
barring the defendant's attempt to obtain double recovery.39 °
383. Id. at 472-73, 493 N.E.2d at 1065.
384. Id. at 469, 493 N.E.2d at 1064. Two other defendants at trial were not parties to
the appeal. On appeal, there were two plaintiffs. Id.
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Id. The defendant subsequently acquired the partnership interest of the two
defendants not parties to the appeal. Id.
389. Id.
390. Id. at 471-72, 493 N.E.2d at 1065. The procedural history of the case was complex. At the trial court level, the plaintiffs moved to dismiss the defendant's counterclaim. The first count of the counterclaim was dismissed due to the existence of an
indemnity agreement in favor of the plaintiffs. The second and third counts were not
dismissed. Before trial, the court also orally announced an entry of summary judgment
in favor of the plaintiffs on the promissory notes. After trial, the jury returned a verdict
in favor of the defendant on the counterclaim in the amount of $46,750. On appeal, the
trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on the promissory notes
was reversed. The appellate court also held that the trial court had erred in dismissing
count one of the defendant's counterclaims. Finally, because a judgment entered on the
verdict returned in favor of the defendant on his counterclaim was nunc pro tunc, the

406

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 18

First, the court affirmed the appellate court's conclusion that the
appellate court had no jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs' appeal of.
the order entered in favor of the defendant on his counterclaim. 39 1
The court disagreed, however, with the appellate court's reversal of
the judgment entered against the defendant.3 92 The court noted
that the issues instruction submitted to the jury required the defendant to prove the same elements in his affirmative defense as in
his counterclaim. Therefore, the court stated that the breach of the
agreement could not absolve the defendant of liability on the note
on a failure of consideration theory and also act as the basis of
recovery of damages for breach of the agreement.393 Further, the
court noted that the counterclaim sought recovery of the same
damages as were alleged in the affirmative defense. Thus, the court
affirmed the judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on the notes, suggesting that a contrary holding would grant the defendant a double
recovery for the plaintiffs' breach as a set-off on the notes and as
damages for the breach.394
VI.

PRODUCTS LIABILITY

A.

39

Duty to Warn

During the Survey period, three Illinois appellate decisions further defined when a manufacturer has a duty to warn of the dangerous propensities of a product. In Van Dettum v. K Mart
39 6 the Illinois
Corporation,
Appellate Court for the Third District
held that, while a failure to warn can make a product unreasonably
plaintiff's post-trial motion, filed more than thirty days after the entry of the order, was
not timely filed. The appellate court therefore had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Id.
at 70-71, 493 N.E.2d at 1064-65.
391. Id. at 471-72, 493 N.E.2d at 1065 (citing Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Barth,
103 Ill. 2d 536, 538, 470 N.E.2d 290 (1984); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1202
(1985)). While the judgment was appealable, the plaintiffs' failure to file the post-trial
motion within thirty days of the entry of the order removed the court of jurisdiction to
hear the appeal. Lombard, 112 Ill. 2d at 472, 493 N.E.2d at 1065.
392. Lombard, 112 Ill. 2d at 472, 493 N.E.2d at 1065.
393. Id.
394. Id. at 472-73, 493 N.E.2d at 1065.
395. Because products liability typically is considered a torts topic, the discussion of
products liability in this article will be restricted to those cases relevant to the potential
manufacturer or distributor defendant. The court in Simpson v. General Motors
Corporation, 108 Ill. 2d 146, 483 N.E.2d 1 (1985), held that contributory negligence
should not be considered in a products liability case, even though misuse and assumption
of risk are available as damage-reducing factors. For a more thorough treatment of this
case's facts and holding, see discussion in the Torts article of this Survey issue.
396. 133 Ill. App. 3d 861, 479 N.E.2d 1104 (3rd Dist. 1985) (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(A), comment j (1965)).

1986]

Commercial Law

dangerous, there is no duty to warn when the product is not defectively designed or manufactured and when the possibility of injury
results from a common propensity of the product which is open
and obvious. The product at issue was an automobile seat cover
manufactured by the defendant, Starlite Industries. 9 7 The plaintiff, Van Dettum, sought relief based upon strict liability, alleging
that the seat cover was of an unreasonably dangerous condition.3 98
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of Starlite.39 9 First, the court set forth the elements of a strict liability cause of action. °° The court indicated
that no duty to warn exists when the product is not defectively
manufactured and an injury results from an open and obvious propensity of the product. 4° 1 According to the Van Dettum court,
products liability law compensates for product-caused injuries derived from a distinct defect that subjects persons exposed to the
product to an unreasonable risk of harm. 4° 2 In Van Dettum, the
court indicated that Starlite did not defectively design the seat
cover for its intended use. Further, the court held the seat cover
not unreasonably dangerous as a matter of law because it was distributed without defects in its intended, functional design." The
court stated that any danger posed should have been obvious to
any user and Starlite therefore had no duty to warn.'
Conversely, in Hayes v. Kay Chemical Co. ," the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District suggested that, under limited circumstances, a manufacturer's duty to warn may extend beyond
labeling and packaging. The product in Hayes was a colorless,
odorless, caustic liquid known as the McD Grill Cleaner, exclu397. Van Dettum, 133 Ill. App. 3d at 862, 479 N.E.2d at 1105. Originally, the complaint named both the manufacturer, Starlite, and the seller, K Mart, as defendants. K
Mart was dismissed in the trial court. Id.
398. Id. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Starlite. Van Dettum
appealed. Id.
399. Id.
400. Id. at 863, 479 N.E.2d at 1105 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402(A) (1965); Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 79 Ill. 2d 26, 402 N.E.2d 194 (1980)).
The appellate court set forth the following three elements of a strict liability cause of
action: (1) injury or damage resulting from a condition of the product; (2) the condition
was an unreasonably dangerous one; and (3) the condition existed when the product left
the manufacturer's control. Van Dettum, 133 Il1. App. 3d at 863, 479 N.E.2d at 1105.
401. Van Dettum, 133 Ill. App. 3d at 863, 479 N.E.2d at 1105 (citing Genaust v.
Illinois Power Co., 62 Ill. 2d 456, 343 N.E.2d 465 (1976)).
402. Van Dettum, 133 Ill. App. 3d at 863, 479 N.E.2d at 1105-06 (citing Hunt v.
Blasius, 74 11. 2d 203, 384 N.E.2d 368 (1978)).
403. Van Dettum, 133 Ill. App. 3d at 863-64, 479 N.E.2d at 1106.
404. Id. at 864, 479 N.E.2d at 1106.
405. 135 Ill. App. 3d 932, 482 N.E.2d 611 (1st Dist. 1985).
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sively used by McDonald's Restaurants. The plaintiff, a McDonald's employee, wiped her hands and arms with a towel which,
unknown to her, was saturated with the cleaner. She suffered severe and permanent burn injuries and scars. 406 In her complaint
against the manufacturer, Hayes alleged that the manufacturer
failed to adequately warn users of the caustic nature of the
product." 7
The court initially addressed whether the manufacturer had a
duty to warn the plaintiff. The Hayes court considered that it was
within the jury's province to determine the foreseeability of the
plaintiff's use of the towel to wipe her hands."° The court proceeded to state that assuming the existence of a duty to warn, the
paramount question then becomes whether the presence of a warning on the container fulfills that duty." 9 The Hayes court stated
that it could not hold as a matter of law that the manufacturer's
duty to identify the liquid caustic material did not extend beyond
the original package. 410 Therefore, the court reversed and remanded the trial court's dismissal of the complaint,41 ' suggesting
that the manufacturer may have a duty "to take the reasonable
precaution of adding coloration or some other distinctive characteristic to decrease
the risks of its being mistakenly taken to be
'412
water.
harmless
In contrast, the Illinois Appellate Court for the Second District
held that as a matter of law, the manufacturer of a football helmet
had no duty to warn when the helmet was not defectively designed
406. Id. at 933, 482 N.E.2d at 612.
407. Id.
408. Id. at 934, 482 N.E.2d at 612-13.
409. Id.
410. Id. at 934-35, 482 N.E.2d at 613.
411. Id. (quoting Ziglar v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 53 N.C. App. 147, 155,
280 S.E.2d 510, 516 (1981)). In analyzing a case factually similar to Hayes, the court in
Ziglar stated:
The law requires a manufacturer to eliminate the dangerous character of goods
to the extent that the exercise of reasonable care, considering all of the circumstances, enables him to do so. It is not without significance, therefore, that
DuPont began bottling Vydate L in gray, opaque containers, on 24 May 1974,
shortly after this tragic incident occurred, as requested by the State of North
Carolina, and that it added amber coloration to the colorless poison in January
1975. Thus, on this record, a critical factual issue, and one not susceptible to
disposition by summary judgment, was whether DuPont was negligent in manufacturing an inherently dangerous toxic substance without taking reasonable
precautions to decrease the risk of its lethal confusion with ordinary, harmless
drinking water.
Ziglar, 53 N.C. App. at 155, 280 S.E.2d at 516 (citations omitted).
412. Hayes, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 935, 482 N.E.2d at 613.
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and the user knew of the possibility of injury.4 13 In Lister v. Bill
Kelley Athletic, Inc.4 14 a jury verdict was entered in favor of the

manufacturer and retail seller defendants. The plaintiff appealed.
The issue on appeal was whether the plaintiff established as a matter of law the manufacturer's liability for failure to warn. 1 5
The Lister court began its analysis by noting that the trial court's
verdict in favor of the defendants implied the conclusion that the
helmet did not contain a design or construction defect and that the
helmet did not cause the plaintiff's back injury.4 1 6 The plaintiff argued that the manufacturer of the helmet created an "illusion of
protection" for the user which needed to be dispelled by a warning
on the helmet. The court, however, distinguished between the inherent danger of a football helmet, a mere type of protective equipment, and that of asbestos products or prescription drugs which
actually cause the alleged injury. 4 7 The court held that, only in
cases involving the latter, could the plaintiff's duty to warn argument be persuasive. Finally, applying the doctrine enunciated in
Van Dettum, the court concluded that the manufacturer had no
duty to warn because the helmet was not defectively designed or
manufactured and a warning would not have apprised the user of a
previously unknown danger.4" 8
B.

Manufacturer and DistributorLiability

Two appellate court decisions during the Survey period clarify
issues of manufacturer and distributor liability. In a case of first
impression, the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District in
Rothe v. Maloney Cadillac,Inc. .419 held that absence of privity between a plaintiff and an automobile manufacturer does not bar a
plaintiff's recovery from the manufacturer for economic loss suffered as a result of breach of implied warranties. The plaintiff in
Rothe uncovered various defects in an automobile he purchased
from the defendant dealer. The dealer never corrected the defects.
The plaintiff therefore initially alleged that the manufacturer de413. Lister v. Bill Kelley Athletic, Inc., 137 Ill. App. 3d 829, 485 N.E.2d 483 (2nd
Dist. 1985).
414. Id.
415. Id. at 834, 485 N.E.2d at 486.
416. Id. at 835, 485 N.E.2d at 487.
417. Id. at 835-36, 485 N.E.2d at 487.
418. Id. at 836, 485 N.E.2d at 487 (citing Riordan v. International Armament Corp,
132 Ill. App. 3d 642, 477 N.E.2d 1293 (1st Dist. 1985)). Zidek v. General Motors Corp.,
66 Ill. App. 3d 982, 384 N.E.2d 509 (2d Dist. 1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402(A), Comment j (1965).
419. 142 Ill. App. 3d 937, 492 N.E.2d 497 (1st Dist. 1986).
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fendant, General Motors, breached an implied warranty of fitness
for ordinary purpose. He claimed this action was justified under
the Magnuson-Moss Warranty - Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act. The trial court dismissed the claim.42 °
On appeal, the appellate court commenced its discussion by noting that the viability of the doctrine of privity of contract in Illinois
controlled whether a manufacturer which dealt indirectly with the
plaintiff was susceptible to liability.42 ' Accordingly, the court was
required to determine whether, absent a collision or impact, privity
between an automobile manufacturer and the purchaser of its
products through an independent dealer was a prerequisite to an
action based upon a breach of implied warranty.422 No Illinois
court had previously addressed this issue. Therefore, the court relied on decisions from other states, and quoted the opinion of the
Florida Supreme Court in Manheim v. Ford Motor Co..423 Confronting the same issue, that court stated:
The world of merchandising is, in brief, no longer a world of
direct contact; it is, rather, a world of advertising and, when representations expressed and disseminated in the mass communication media and on labels (attached to the goods themselves)
prove false and the user or consumer is damaged by reason of his
reliance on those representations, it is difficult to justify the manufacturer's denial of liability on the sole ground of absence of
technical privity.424
As further support for its finding, the court referred to similar precedent from California,4 2" North Dakota,4 26 and Texas.4 27 Finally,
420. Id. at 939, 492 N.E.2d at 498 (citing Magnuson-Moss Warranty - Federal
Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1) (1982)). The trial court
dismissed the counts against General Motors and Maloney for breach of implied warranty under both the Magnuson-Moss Act and U.C.C. The following issues were discussed on appeal: (1) whether the lack of contractual privity barred the plaintiff's actions
against General Motors; and (2) whether the disclaimers contained in Maloney's sales
contract barred the counts against him. With respect to counts against Maloney, the
appellate court concluded that the U.C.C. warranty count properly was dismissed but
that the trial court had erred in dismissing the Magnuson-Moss count. Rothe, 142 Ill.
App. 3d at 939, 492 N.E.2d at 498.
421. Rothe, 142 Ill. App. 3d at 940, 492 N.E.2d at 499.
422. Id. at 942, 492 N.E.2d at 500.
423. Id. (quoting Manheim v. Ford Motor Co., 201 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 1967)).
424. Rothe, 147 Ill. App. 3d at 942, 492 N.E.2d at 501.
425. Id. at 942-43, 492 N.E.2d at 501. (citing Werber v. Mercedes-Benz of North
America, Inc., 152 Cal. App. 3d 1039, 199 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1984) (exception to the privity
rule applied to the purchase of an automobile due to changing economic conditions and
concepts of justice).
426. Rothe, 142 Ill. App. 3d at 943-44, 492 N.E.2d at 501-02. The court stated:
It is perfectly clear, therefore, that where a sale is made under a trade name and
where the manufacturer has conducted a national advertising campaign and
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the court indicated that policy considerations mandated protecting
a consumer from a defective product and placing the burden of loss
on the party responsible.42 Thus, the court concluded that lack of
privity did not preclude the action against General Motors.429
With regard to distributor liability, the Illinois Appellate Court
for the First District held in Skarski v. Ace-Chicago Great Dane
Corp.430 that a plaintiff may recover damages from a distributor
under a products liability theory. 41 The defendant distributor in
Skarski bought a refrigerated trailer, intending to later resell it. A
servicer of refrigeration units employed the plaintiff as a mechanic
to repair a freon leak in the defendant's unit. The refrigeration
unit fell from the trailer and the plaintiff sustained injuries.4 32 The
trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant
and the plaintiff appealed.
In its analysis, the appellate court stated that all persons in the
distributive chain had potential liability for injuries resulting from
sales are accomplished through local dealers, the demand for such products is
created by the advertising of the manufacturer. The purpose of the advertising
conducted by such manufacturer is to cultivate the ultimate consumer. Thus,
where the article sold as a new article is defectively manufactured, the interests
of the ultimate consumers can be protected only by eliminating the requirement
of privity between the manufacturer and his dealers and the expected ultimate
consumer. It would be unreasonable to hold that, if a buyer purchases, for
example, a 'Ford' or 'Chevrolet' or 'Cadillac' or 'Chrysler' or any other make of
automobile, no implied warranty of merchantable quality can be asserted by the
purchaser against the manufacturer even though the particular car delivered as
a new automobile is in such bad condition and so defective in materials or construction that it cannot be operated at all and is wholly useless or unsatisfactory
for the ordinary purposes which such automobile is designed to serve.
Accordingly, under modem marketing conditions, when a manufacturer puts a
new truck-tractor or other new product into the stream of trade and promotes
its sale to the public, an implied warranty that it is reasonably fit and suitable
for use, as such, accompanies such new vehicle into the hands of the ultimate
buyer. Absence of privity between the manufacturer and the buyer is
immaterial.
Id. (quoting Lang v. General Motors Corp., 136 N.W. 2d 805, 809-10 (N.D. 1965)).
427. Rothe, 142 Ill. App. 3d at 944, 492 N.E.2d at 502 (quoting Nobility Homes of
Texas, Inc. v. Shrivers, 557 S.W. 2d 77, 81-82 (Tex. 1977)). The court in Nobility Homes
stated "To hold [that lack of privity precludes action against manufacturers] would encourage manufacturers to employ 'thinly capitalized collapsible corporations to sell their
commercially inferior products leaving no one for the buyer to sue for his economic
loss.'"
428. Rothe, 142 Ill. App. 3d at 945, 492 N.E.2d at 502.
429. Id.
430. 138 Ill. App. 3d 301, 485 N.E.2d 1312 (1st Dist. 1985).
431. Id. at 306, 485 N.E.2d at 1315.
432. Id. at 304, 485 N.E.2d at 1314.
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a defective product. 33 In Skarski, the court disregarded the inference that no entity down the distributive chain had an identical
duty to that of a manufacturer.4 34 Instead, the court stressed the
primary public policy concern of whether the injured user or the
seller, should bear the loss. 435 The court weighed these competing
interests and concluded that the more solvent seller should bear
the loss because he could prevent the product from entering the
stream of commerce.436 Moreover, the court noted that the seller
could employ inspection procedures to enhance the safety of the
product.437
Finally, the court rejected the contention that the defendant escaped liability because the trailer had not entered the stream of
commerce. 438 The court held that the defective trailer was in the
stream of commerce at the time of the plaintiff's injury because the
distributor attempted to repair the trailer in order to realize a profit
upon sale. 439 Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the trial
court's grant of summary judgment for the defendant."'
VII.

CONSUMER PROTECTION

The Illinois Supreme Court did not decide any significant cases
in the area of consumer protection during the Survey year. One
case, not fully litigated at the termination of the Survey year, Kellerman v. MCI Telecommunications Corporation 41 involved MCI's
alleged violations of the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business
Practices Act. To date, the Kellerman court has addressed only
two issues. First, the court has considered whether the Federal
433. Id. at 305, 485 N.E.2d at 1315 (citing Hammond v. North American Asbestos
Corp., 97 Ill. 2d 195, 454 N.E.2d 210 (1983)).
434. Skarski, 138 Ill. App. 3d at 306, 485 N.E.2d at 1315 (citing Simpson v. General
Motors Corp., 118 Ill. App. 3d 479, 455 N.E.2d 37 (1st Dist. 1983), aff'd, 108 Ill. 2d.
146, 493 N.E.2d 1 (1985)).
435. Skarski, 138 Ill. App. 3d at 306, 485 N.E.2d at 1315.
436. Id.
437. Id.
438. Id.
439. Id. at 307-08, 485 N.E.2d at 1316 (citing Boddie v. Litton Unit Handling Systems, 118 Ill. App. 3d 520, 530, 455 N.E.2d 142, 149 (1st Dist. 1983)). The court in
Boddie asserted that to be considered in the stream of commerce, it is sufficient that the
defendant is in the business of selling the product and markets it to a buyer. Boddie, 118
Ill. App. 3d at 530, 455 N.E.2d at 149.
440. Skarski, 138 Ill. App. 3d at 310, 485 N.E.2d at 1318. In response to the defendant's argument that it could not be liable in products liability because the plaintiff was not
the ultimate user of the trailer, the court asserted that it was an issue of foreseeability,
requiring a jury determination, and thus remanded that issue to the trial court. Id.
441. See Kellerman v. MCI Telecommunications Corporation, 112 Ill. 2d 428, 434,
493 N.E.2d 1045, 1047 (1986) (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1211/2, para. 261-272 (1985)).
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Communications Act of 1934 preempted the plaintiff's state law
action. 442 And second, the court determined whether it should
stay the proceedings pending review of the claims by the Federal
Communications Commission." 3 Thus the decisions bear no relevance to a survey of consumer protection law. 4 "
VIII. RECENT LEGISLATION
A. PartnershipLegislation
A recent public act, now codified, governs limited partnerships
and corporations." 5 The new act creates the Revised Uniform
Limited Partnership Act (the "Act") and repeals the Uniform
Limited Partnership Act of 1917.4 6 Furthermore, amendments to
the Business Corporation Act of 1983 have been enacted. 447 Those
amendments became effective January 1, 1987.14 Additionally,
the new Partnership Act is effective July 1, 1987. 449
Article 1 of the Act contains general provisions regarding the
Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act,45 ° including the short
title and definitions pertinent to the Partnership Act. 45 ' Addition-

ally, article 1 provides restrictions for naming a limited partnership.452 Pursuant to article 1 the name must include the words
"limited partnership" and must not include a limited partner's
name unless the name is also that of a general partner or a corpo442. Kellerman, 112 Ill. 2d at 434, 493 N.E.2d at 1047 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 151
(1982)).
443. Kellerman, 112 111. 2d at 434, 493 N.E.2d at 1047 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
110, para. 2-619(a)(3) (1985)). The court indicated that the state law actions were not
preempted by the Federal Communications Act, nor should they have been stayed pending a review by the Federal Communications Commission. Kellerman, 112 Ill. 2d at 434,
493 N.E.2d at 1047.
444. Other appellate court determinations affecting consumer's rights more appropriately are labelled public utility cases and primarily involve statutory construction. See
Independent Voters of Illinois v. Illinois Commerce Commission, 139 Ill. App. 3d 957,
487 N.E.2d 963 (2nd Dist. 1985) (public utility rate fixing is a legislative function delegated to the Commission, not the judiciary); see also Moenning v. Illinois Bell Telephone
Co., 139 Ill. App. 3d 521, 487 N.E.2d 980 (1st Dist. 1985) (telephone company held
statutorily exempt from the Consumer Credit Protection Act). See also Fineman v. Citicorp, 137 Ill. App. 3d 1035, 485 N.E.2d 591 (1st Dist. 1985), discussed supra at notes
296-311 and accompanying text.
445. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, paras. 1.05, 1.80, 2.10, 6.25, 9.05, 12.25, 14.20, 14.25,
16.05, ch. 1061/2, paras. 151-1 to 160-5 (Supp. 1986).
446. Id.
447. Id.
448. Id.
449. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 106'/2, paras. 151-1 to 160.5 (Supp. 1986).
450. Id. at paras. 151-1 to 151-9.
451. Id. at paras. 151-1 to 151-2.
452. Id. at para. 151-3.
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rate general partner. 4 3 These name restrictions do not apply to
limited partnerships formed under the Uniform Limited Partnership Act of 1917. 454
Furthermore, article 1 provides that each limited partnership
must maintain a registered agent and a registered office,4 5 and that
certain records be maintained at the registered office. 456 Among
the required records is a writing setting forth the following information: the times for additional contributions; 45 7 the rights of any
partner to receive or of any general partner to make distributions
to a partner; 4 8 the rights of any limited partner to assign any part
of his partnership interest;45 9 and any events upon the happening of
which the limited partnership is to be dissolved. 4 ' Finally, article
1 enumerates how to serve process on a limited partnership 46' and
defines the "assumed name" of a limited partnership.462
Article 2 addresses the formation of limited partnerships. 463 It
provides that a certificate of limited partnership must be executed
and filed in the office of the Secretary of State in Springfield or
Chicago.4 " Paragraph 158-1 of article 2 further specifies the necessary elements of a certificate of limited partnership.465 These elements include the name, purpose, and address of the limited
partnership.466 Additionally, the certificate must contain the name
and business address of each general partner.467 Furthermore, the
certificate must set forth the aggregate amount of cash and a description and statement of the aggregate agreed value of the other
property or services contributed by the partners and which the
partners have agreed to contribute. 468 Finally, the limited partnership certificate must describe the time or events whereby a partner
453.
454.
455.
456.
457.

Id.
Id.
Id. at para. 151-4.
Id. at para. 151-5.
Id.

458.
459.
460.
461.
462.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at para. 151-8.
Id. at para. 151-9. An assumed name is the equivalent of an alias, or another

name by which the corporation is known to the public. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 112

(5th ed.
463.
464.
Id.
465.
466.
467.
468.

1979).
Id. at paras. 152-1 to 152-9.
Id. at para. 152-1. Filing is no longer done by the County Recorder of Deeds.
Id. at para. 152-1.
Id.
Id.
ld.
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may terminate his membership 469 and specify the latest date upon
which the limited partnership is to dissolve. 470

Article 2 also

makes allowances for amendments to or cancellation of a limited
partnership certificate. 47 1 Article 2 further provides that any per-

son executing a false statement in the certificate 472 or any general
partner having constructive notice thereof 7 3 may be liable to those
suffering damages as a result of reliance on the false statement.474
Article 3 of the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act covers limited partners. 47 5 This article first addresses the subsequent

admission of additional limited partners.476 It provides that any
person who directly acquires or who is an assignee of a partnership
interest may be admitted as an additional limited partner. If the
partnership agreement does not provide for the admission of additional limited partners, the current partners may admit the person
pursuant to their unanimous written consent.477 Furthermore, article 3 allows the partnership agreement to grant all or a specified
group of limited partners the right to vote upon any matter. 478 It
also defines a limited partner's liability to third parties.4 79 Gener-

ally, a limited partner is not liable for the obligations of the limited
partnership unless he or she is also a general partner. 480 Nevertheless, when a third party reasonably believes he is transacting business with a general partner, but is actually dealing with a limited
partner, the limited partner may assume liability if he participates
in the control of the business.481 Article 3 concludes by listing types
of conduct which do not constitute participation in control of the
business.482
469.
470.
471.
472.
473.
474.
475.
476.
477.
478.
479.
480.
481.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at paras. 152-2, 152-3.
at para. 152-7.

at paras. 153-1 to 153-6.
at para. 153-1.
at para. 153-2.
at para. 153-3.

482. Id. The statute lists several types of conduct that do not constitute participating
in control of the business. This conduct includes being a contractor for an agent or employee of the limited partnership or a general partner; consulting or advising a general
partner as to the business of the partnership; acting as surety or guarantor for the partnership; taking action to bring or pursue a derivative action in the right of the partnership; offering, approving or disapproving certain types of proposals; winding up the
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Article 4 contains provisions relating to general partners.4 3
First, admission of additional general partners occurs in the same
manner as does admission of additional limited partners.48 4 Moreover, the article enumerates certain events of withdrawal which
suffice to remove a general partner from the partnership. 4 5 Article
4 also provides that general partners have the liabilities of a partner
in an ordinary partnership subject to exceptions set out in the
Act.48 6 Finally, article 4 provides that a partnership agreement
may grant voting rights to general partners on any basis, either
separately or to all or any class of the limited partners.487
Article 5 of the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act addresses financing of a limited partnership. 488 The article indicates
that a partner's contribution may be in cash, property, services rendered, or a promissory note of some type. 48 9 Additionally, a limited
partner's promise to contribute is enforceable only if it satisfies the
Statute of Frauds. 49 ° An enforceable promise to contribute exists
even if a partner cannot perform due to death, disability, or any
other reason. 491 An obligation to contribute may be compromised
only upon consent of all the partners. 492 Article 5 also states that
profits and losses of a limited partnership are allocated among the
partners, and among classes of partners, in the manner provided in
the partnership agreement. 493 Absent such a provision in the partnership agreement, profits and losses are allocated on the basis of
the value of the contributions made by each partner if the contributions have been received and not yet returned by the partnership.4 94
Article 6 pertains to distributions and withdrawal.495 The article
provides for interim distributions,496 withdrawal of general and
limited partners, 49 7 distribution upon withdrawal, 498 distribution in
partnership; and exercising any rights afforded to limited partners under the Act. Id. at
para. 153-3.
483. Id. at paras. 154-1 to 154-5.
484. Id. at para. 154-1.
485. Id. at para. 154-2.
486. Id. at para. 154-3.
487. Id. at para. 154-5.
488. Id. at paras. 155-1 to 155-4.
489. Id. at para. 155-1.
490. Id. at para. 155-2.
491. Id.
492. Id.
493. Id. at para. 155-3.
494. Id.
495. Id. at paras. 156-1 to 156-8.
496. Id. at para. 156-1.
497. Id. at paras. 156-2, 156-3.
498. Id. at para. 156-4.
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kind,4 99 right to distribution,5 "' limitations on distribution, 50 1 and
liability upon return of contribution. °2 Article 7 allows for assignment of partnership interests.50 3 Article 7 states that a partnership
interest is personal property.5 ° The article also provides that, unless prohibited by the partnership agreement, a partnership interest
is assignable in whole or in part.50 5 The article notes that assignment does not operate to dissolve the partnership. 0 6 Moreover,
following the assignment of his or her interest, the assignor is not
released from liability
to the limited partnership under certain sec50 7
tions of the Act.
Dissolution of a limited partnership is governed by Article 8 of
the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act. 0 ' Pursuant to that
article, a partnership is dissolved and its affairs should be wound
up if any one of the following events occurs: 50 9 the time specified
in the certificate of limited partnership lapses;5 10 all partners give
written consent of dissolution;5 1' a general partner withdraws and
there are no other general partners or the remaining partners do
not agree in writing to continue the partnership and appoint addi5 13
tional general partners; 51 2 or, a judicial dissolution is entered.
Article 8 also states that, except as otherwise provided in the partnership agreement, the general partners or limited partners who
have not wrongfully dissolved a limited partnership, may wind up
the limited partnership's affairs.5" 4
Finally, Article 8 sets forth priority for distribution of assets
upon dissolution. 1
Assets are distributed first to creditors, including partners who are creditors;5 16 second to partners and former partners for interim distributions not constituting a return of
499.
500.
501.
502.
503.
504.
505.
506.
507.
508.
509.
510.
511.
512.
513.
514.
515.
516.

Id. at para. 156-5.
Id. at para. 156-6.
Id. at para. 156-7.
Id. at para. 156-8.
Id. at paras. 157-1 to 157-5.
Id. at para. 157-1.
Id. at para. 157-2.
Id.
Id. at para. 157-4.
Id. at paras. 158-1 to 158-4.
Id. at para. 158-1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at para. 158-3.
Id. at para. 158-4.
Id.

418
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contribution or distribution upon withdrawal; 17 third to partners
for return of their contributions; 18 and fourth to partners for their
partnership interests in the proportions in which they share in
distributions. 1 9
Article 9 concerns Foreign Limited Partnerships. 520 The article
indicates that the laws of the state or other jurisdiction under
which a foreign limited partnership is formed govern the business
of the partnership.5 2 ' To transact business in Illinois, a foreign
limited partnership must be admitted to do so by the Secretary of
State.5 22 Admission may be granted only after the limited partnership files an application to the Secretary of State.523 The applica5 24
tion may be amended by filing a certificate of amendment.
Additionally, a foreign limited partnership transacting business in
Illinois may not maintain a civil action until it is admitted to do
business within the state.5 25 Failure to acquire admission, however, does not impair any contract's validity. Neither does it impair the act of any foreign limited partnership or prevent foreign
limited partnerships from defending any civil action in any Illinois
court.

26

Finally, the article sets forth the procedure for service of

27
process on a foreign limited partnership.
528
Article 10 contains provisions governing derivative actions.

Fees and other matters are detailed in Article 11.529 Article 12 con-

tains provisions involving construction, application, and judicial
review under the Administrative Review Law. 530 Lastly, Article
5 31
13 includes amendatory provisions and repealers.
Article 14 of the new legislation amends the Business Corporation Act of 1983.532 Article 14 specifically refines paragraphs 1.05,
1.80, 2.10, 6.25, 9.05, 12.25, 14.20, 14.25, and 16.05 of the 1983
517. Id.
518. Id.
519. Id.
520. Id. at paras. 159-1 to 159-11.
521. Id. at para. 159-1.
522. Id. at para. 159-2.
523. Id.
524. Id. at para. 159-5.
525. Id. at para. 159-7.
526. Id.
527. Id. at para. 159-9.
528. Id. at paras. 160-1 to 160-4.
529. Id. at paras. 161-1 to 161-6.
530. Id. at paras. 161-1 to 161-5.
531. Id. at para. 211.1.
532. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, paras. 1.05, 1.80, 2.10, 6.25, 9.05, 12.25, 14.20, 14.25,
16.05 (Supp. 1986).
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Act. 533 Paragraph 1.05 authorizes rulemaking by the Secretary of
State 534 and repeals provisions relating to powers retained by the
General Assembly.5 35 Article 14 also amends the statutory definition of paid-in capital. In addition to its definition under the old
act, paid-in capital includes "amounts added or transferred to
paid-in capital by action of the board of directors or shareholders
pursuant to a share dividend, share split, or otherwise, minus reductions from that sum effected by an acquisition of its own shares,
to the extent of the amount of paid-in capital represented by such
'5 36
acquired shares.
Another provision of Article 14 amends the provisions in paragraph 2.10 which govern Articles of Incorporation.53 7 Prior to the
amendment, paragraph 2.10 required that the Articles of Incorporation set forth the following items: a sufficient corporate name;
the purpose for which the corporation is organized; the address of
the corporation's registered office and name of its registered agent;
the name and address of each incorporator; the number of shares
of each class that the corporation is authorized to issue; and the
number and class of shares which the corporation will issue without further report to the Secretary of State and the consideration to
be received by the corporation for those shares.5 38 Pursuant to the
amendment, the sixth item is altered to allow deduction of expenses, including commissions paid or incurred in connection with
the issuance of shares. 39
Paragraph 6.25 provides for consideration of shares. 54° With the
passage of the new legislation, a corporation may, with board of
director approval, allow stock dividends or stock splits.5 4 1 This authority, however, is qualified in that the value fixed by the board of
directors in connection with such dividend or split must be transferred to paid-in capital of the corporation and any such issuance
must be authorized
by a majority of holders of shares of the class
2
or series. 1

A significant change also exists with regard to reduction of the
533.
534.
535.
536.
537.
538.
539.
540.
541.
542.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at para. 1.05.
at para. 1.80.
at para. 2.10.

at para. 6.25.
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annual franchise tax.543 Paragraph 9.05 governs the power of a
corporation to acquire its own shares. 544 The new amendment affects that power only to the extent that the basis of the annual
franchise tax payable by the corporation may not be reduced until
a report documenting a corporation's acquisition of its own shares
is first filed with the Secretary of State. 545 Furthermore, if the required report is not filed before the first day of the anniversary
month of a taxable year and before payment of its annual franchise
tax, the annual franchise tax for that taxable year may never be
reduced. 546
Finally, the last important change in the Business Corporation
Act of 1983 affects Revocation of Dissolution as found in Paragraph 12.25 .1 4 The only new proviso with respect to revocation of
dissolution states that failure to file a revocation of dissolution in
conformity with the Act does not constitute sufficient grounds for
rejection of the filing by the Secretary of State. A penalty, how548
ever, may be imposed.
B.

CorporationsLegislation

The Business Corporation Act of 1983 underwent significant
changes during the Survey period. 549 A recent public act, now
codified and effective August 23, 1985, added new sections to the
Act regarding the vote required for certain business combinations
and considerations in discharge of duties.550 Furthermore, with
the passage of this new act, the Illinois General Assembly amended
numerous sections of the Business Corporation Act. 55 ' Those
amendments were effective as of January 1, 1986.52
Paragraphs 7.85 and 8.85 have been added to the Business Corporation Act of 1983 to define the rights of majority and minority
stockholders during takeover. 5 3 Together, the new paragraphs op543. Id. at para. 9.05.
544. Id.
545. Id.
546. Id.
547. Id. at para. 12.25.
548. Id.
549. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, paras. 1.10 to 16.10 (1985). For a discussion of the
amendments to the Act, see infra notes 532-48 and accompanying text.
550. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, paras. 7.85, 8.85 (1985).
551. Id. at paras. 1.10, 1.15, 1.17, 1.30, 1.45, 1.70, 1.80, 2.05, 2.10, 2.30, 4.05, 4.15,
4.20, 4.25, 5.10, 5.25, 5.30, 6.50, 7.10, 7.25, 7.75, 8.35, 8.65, 9.05, 10.05, 10.20, 10.30,
11.05, 11.10, 11.30, 12.20, 12.40, 12.50, 13.45, 13.70, 14.05, 14.25, 15.10, 16.05, 16.10.
552. Id.
553. Id. at paras. 7.85, 8.85.
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erate to protect minority shareholders' interests from being
"squeezed out" after a hostile takeover. Typically, a hostile takeover is accomplished via a front-end-loaded takeover. The frontend-loaded takeover occurs in two stages. The first stage consists
of a cash tender offer in which the acquiror obtains enough stock of
the target company to achieve voting control. During the second
stage, the acquiror effectively votes in a merger, consolidation or
similar business combination with the acquiror's company or an
affiliate thereof.
Paragraph 7.85 applies after the first stage of the front endloaded takeover. Following a successful tender offer, amended paragraph 7.85 states that the tender offeror becomes an "interested
shareholder" and must comply with either a super majority voting
requirement or certain price and procedure conditions. 54 The paragraph provides that certain business combinations require approval by eighty percent of all voting shares, including "interested
shareholders." Additionally, the paragraph requires a simple majority of all shares entitled to vote, excluding those of interested
shareholders. 55 The higher vote requirement applies only to five
business combinations:5 56 mergers, consolidations, or share exchanges of a corporation or subsidiary which after such combination create an "affiliate" 55 7 or an "associate" 55 " of an "interested
shareholder.

' 559

Second, the amendment applies to any sale, lease,

exchange, mortgage, pledge, transfer or other disposition of at least
ten percent of the corporation's net worth."6 Paragraph 7.85 also
controls the issuance or transfer of a corporation's securities to an
"interested shareholder.

5 61

The fourth category of business com-

binations includes the adoption of any plan or proposal for the liq554. Id. at para. 7.85(a). The new Business Corporation Act defines Interested
Shareholder as "any person (other than the corporation or subsidiary) who or which:
(a) is the beneficial owner, directly or indirectly, of Voting Shares conveying 10% or
more of the combined voting power of the outstanding Voting Shares; or (b) is an Affiliate
or Associate of the corporation and at any time within the 2-year period immediately
prior to the date in question was the beneficial owner, directly or indirectly, of Voting
Shares conveying 10% or more of the combined voting power of the then outstanding
Voting Shares." Id. at para. 7.85(C)(2).
555. Id. at para. 7.85.

556. Id.
557. Id. Paragraph 7.85 provides that affiliate and associate have the same meanings
under the new Business Corporation Act as under the Rule 12b-2 of the General Rules
and Regulations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Id.
558. Id.
559. Id.
560. Id.
561. Id.
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uidation or dissolution of the corporation if proposed by an
"interested shareholder.""56 Finally, the amended act applies to
any reclassifications, recapitalizations, mergers, consolidations or
share exchanges which increase the proportionate share of the outstanding shares of any class of the corporation's stock where the
corporation is owned by an "interested shareholder." '6 3
In two circumstances, paragraph 7.85 does not require the
higher vote requirement and instead permits application of the voting requirements of the Business Corporation Act or of a corporation's articles of incorporation. 564 The first of these circumstances
occurs when two-thirds of the "disinterested directors" approve
the business combination. 65 The purpose of this exception is to
protect friendly transactions from stricter voting requirements.
The higher voting requirement is also waived upon fulfillment of
certain price and procedure requirements.5 66 Fulfillment of these
requirements ensures fair compensation for minority shareholders.
Pursuant to the price and procedure conditions, shareholders are
fairly compensated for selling their stock back to the corporation
and are protected from receiving highly subordinated bonds or
"junk bonds." The formula used to determine the amount of compensation depends upon the type of stock involved.5 67 Essentially,
all of the formulas limit the consideration paid to shareholders to
cash or to the same form of consideration as paid by the "interested shareholder" in acquiring identical stock. Paragraph 7.85 sets
forth the formulas in detail.56 8 Paragraph 7.85 provides that nothing within the paragraph relieves an interested shareholder of the
562. Id.
563. Id.
564. Id.
565. Id. Paragraph 7.85(B)(1) provides:
'Disinterested Director' means any member of the board of the corporation
who: (a) is neither the Interested Shareholder nor an Affiliate or Associate of
the Interested Shareholder; (b) was a member of the board of directors prior to
the time that the Interested Shareholder became an Interested Shareholder, or
was recommended to succeed a Disinterested Director by a majority of the Disinterested Shareholders then in office; and (c) was not nominated for election as
a director by the Interested Shareholder or any Affiliate or Associate of the
Interested Shareholder.
Id. at para. 7.81 (B)(1).
566. Id. at para. 7.85.
567. Id. The price conditions for common stock are contained in paragraph
7.85(B)(2)(a). The price paid must equal at least the highest of one of two formulas
provided. Similarly, the price conditions for preferred stock are contained in paragraph
7.85(B)(2)(b). Again, the price paid must be at least the highest of one of four formulas
in the statute. Id. at para. 7.85 (B)(2)(a),(b).
568. Id. at para. 7.85(B)(2).
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fiduciary obligations imposed by law. 69
Paragraph 8.85 provides that the board of directors, committees
of the board, individual directors and individual officers may consider the effects of any discharge of their respective duties.57 The
paragraph enumerates the effects of "any action upon the employees, suppliers and customers of the corporation, communities in
which offices or other establishments of the corporation are located
'
and all other pertinent factors."571
Other amendments to the Business Corporation Act of 1983 was
enacted on September 23, 1985.572 This legislation, effective Janu-

ary 1, 1986, amends numerous paragraphs of the Business Corporation Act of 1983. 573 Most of the amendments result in minimal
changes, though a few represent a departure from existing law.
Only those amendments which significantly change existing law
are discussed below.
Paragraph 1.15 pertains to statements of correction.574 It provides that when an instrument filed with the Secretary of State contains errors, the instrument may be corrected by filing a statement
of correction. Under the amended act, most of paragraph 1.15 remains intact. The only substantive changes further define what a
statement of correction may not do.575 Presently, a statement of
correction may not alter provisions of the articles of incorporation
regarding the corporation name, the number of authorized shares,
business estimates, any statements made in lieu of estimates, and
the names and addresses of the incorporators. 76 Similarly, a statement of correction for an application for a certificate of authority
for a foreign corporation may not change these provisions. 77 Finally, a statement of correction may not alter "provisions of an
application to adopt or change an assumed corporate name with
respect to [that] name; ...

provisions of a report following merger

with respect to the estimates of the property of the corporation, or
any statements made in lieu of these estimates...; and the wording
569. Id. at para. 7.85.
570. Id. at para. 8.85.
571. Id.
572. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, paras. 1.10, 1.15, 1.17, 1.30, 1.45, 1.70, 1.80, 2.05, 2.10,
2.30, 4.05, 4.15, 4.20, 4.25, 5.10, 5.25, 5.30, 6.50, 7.10, 7.25, 7.75, 8.35, 8.65, 9.05, 10.05,
10.30, 11.05, 11.10, 11.30, 12.20, 12.40, 12.50, 13.45, 13.70, 14.05, 14.25, 15.10, 16.05,
16.10 (1985).
573. Id.
574. Id. at para. 1.15.
575. Id.
576. Id.
577. Id.
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of any resolution as filed in any report with the Secretary of State
and which was57in
fact adopted by the board of directors or by the
8
shareholders.
Paragraph 1.70 of the Business Corporation Act refers to miscellaneous applications of the Act. 579 The Business Corporation Act
applies to treasury shares.5 8 0 Under amended paragraph 1.70,
there are four provisions concerning treasury shares;5 ' (1) they
remain treasury shares until they are sold, used as payment of a
dividend, restored to the status of authorized and unissued or cancelled; 58 2 (2) they may not at any time be voted or counted to determine the total number of outstanding voting shares; 583 (3) a
corporation must report to the Secretary of State any reauthoriza58 4
tion and reissuance of treasury shares within sixty days thereof;
85
reported.1
be
and (4) cancellation of treasury shares must
58 6
Paragraph 5.25 sets out the standards for service of process.
Pursuant to the new legislation, the Secretary of State acts as the
agent of any domestic corporation or foreign corporation having a
certificate of authority.58 7 Accordingly, any process, notice or demand may be served upon the Secretary of State. 88 Paragraph
5.25 further delineates the amended procedures for service of
5 89
process.
The last significant changes in the Business Corporation Act of
1983 are found in Paragraph 9.05.59.

Paragraph 9.05, which con-

cerns the power of a corporation to acquire its own shares, now
provides that, when a corporation acquires its own shares, the
shares are cancelled. 91 The shares are considered authorized but
unissued.592 Moreover, "if the articles of incorporation provide
that such shares shall not be reissued, then the number of authorized shares is reduced by the number of shares acquired. ' 593 Fi578.
579.
580.
581.
582.
583.
584.
585.
586.
587.
588.
589.
590.
591.
592.
593.

Id.
Id. at para. 1.70.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at para. 5.25.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at para. 9.05.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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nally, Paragraph 9.05(b) is further amended by the provision that a
corporation which acquires its own shares may pledge those shares
as security for the payment of their purchase price. 94 These shares
do not become cancelled shares or authorized but unissued shares
if the acquired and pledged shares are not voted; counted to determine the total number of issued voting shares; or called upon payment of the purchase price so as to create authorized but unissued
shares. 9
C. Securities Regulation Legislation
Two recently codified acts contribute significantly to the laws
governing securities regulation. First, the Illinois General Assembly amended section 8-320 of the U.C.C..5 96 This legislation was
approved November 14, 1985 and became effective on that same
date.5 97 Section 8-320 of the U.C.C. provides for5 transfer
or pledge
98
of securities within a central depository system.
The amended section defines two new terms.5 99 A "registered
clearing corporation" is defined as "an entity or organization registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission as a clearing
agency under section 17a of the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934."1 Second, a "foreign clearing corporation" is defined as
"an entity or organization in the business of holding securities
outside the United States on behalf of others and with which a
registered clearing corporation is permitted by the Securities and
Exchange Commission to maintain securities positions". 0 1
In addition to providing new definitions, section 8-320, as
6°
amended, expands the group of securities covered by the U.C.C.. 2
Amended section 8-320 applies to securities in the custody of a
clearing corporation, another clearing corporation, a foreign clearing corporation, a custodian bank or a nominee of any of them
subject to the instructions of the clearing corporation. °3 Furthermore, section 8-320 covers securities which are forwarded by any
of the above entities to an issuer or transfer agent in order to regis594.
595.
596.
597.
598.
599.
600.
601.
602.
603.

Id.
Id.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, para. 8-320 (1985).
Id.
Id.
Id. paras. 8-320(6),(7).
Id. at para. 8-320.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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ter a transfer or pledge of the security. 604 The securities covered by
section 8-320 must be in bearer form" 5 and be endorsed by an appropriate person or registered in the name of the clearing corporation, another clearing corporation, a foreign clearing corporation, a
custodian bank or a nominee of any of them.60 6 Finally, securities
now covered by Section 8-320 must be shown on the account of a
transferor or pledgor on the books of the clearing corporation. 60
Aside from the new definitions and expansion of securities covered,
section 8-320 remains intact.6 °8
Amendments and new sections also modify the Illinois Securities
Law of 1953. 609 This legislation was signed into law on September
23, 1985 and became effective January 1, 1986.610 Pursuant to one

new law, the Illinois Securities Law definition of "controlling person" in section 2.4 includes a person who not only sells a security
but offers one as well. 61

Accordingly, the definition of offer in

section 2.5 has been excluded.61 2 In section 2.5a, the new Illinois
Securities Law defines an offer as "every offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to purchase, a security or interest in a security
for value.

'6 13

Additionally, section 2.6, which defines underwriter,

and section 2.9, which defines salesperson, have been amended to
recognize the offering of securities.614 Section 2.11 of the Illinois
Securities Law of 1953 provides the definition of "investment advisor." 61 I Following the passage of this new legislation, this defini-

tion extends to registered salespersons whose performance is
incidental to conducting the business of the registered dealer or
registered salesperson and who receives no special compensation
for such services.61 6
A term defined in section 2.16 is also modified.61 7 Previously,
604. Id.
605. Id.
606. Id.
607. Id.
608. Id.
609. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1211/2, paras. 137.2-4, 137.2-5, 137.2-5a, 137.2-6, 137.2-9,
137.2-11, 137.2-13, 137.2-16, 137.2-17b, 137.2-17c, 137.2-17d, 137.2-17e, 137.3, 137.4,
137.5, 137.6, 137.7, 137.8, 137.9, 137.10, 137.11, 137.11a, 137.12, 137.13, 137.14, 137.15,
137.15a, 137.16 (1985).
610. Id.
611. Id. at para. 137.2-4.
612. Id. at para. 137.2-5.
613. Id. at para. 137.2-5a.
614. Id. at para. 137.2-6, 137.2-9.
615. Id. at para. 137.2-11.
616. Id.
617. Id. at para. 137.2-16.
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section 2.16 contained the definition of "securities commissioner. ' 618 Now, the term "securities commissioner" has been replaced by "securities director" and the latter has been defined as
the chief administrator, rather than the clerk, of the Securities
Department.6 9
New sections 2.17b, 2.17c, 2.17d and 2.17e now exist in the Illinois Securities Law of 1953.620 These sections do not create any
substantive changes. Instead, they simply amend the Securities
Law's references to other legislation. The references have been updated to cite to amended versions of the same legislation. 62'
Section 3 of the Illinois Securities Law also was subjected to significant revisions.622 Section 3 removes certain securities from the
ambit of the provisions in sections 5, 6, and 7.623 Section 3 adds to
the exemptions set out in section 3C. 624 In addition to the previously listed exemptions, 625 amended section 3C exempts "any interest or participation in any common trust fund or similar fund
maintained by any such bank, savings institution or trust company
exclusively for the collective investment and reinvestment of assets
contributed thereto by such bank, savings institution or trust company or any affiliate thereof, in its capacity as fiduciary, trustee,
executor, administrator or guardian. ' 626 Other subsections of section 3 remain unchanged.627
Section 4's enumeration of exempt transactions also has been
amended 62 1 to include offers, in addition to the previously exempted sales. 629 Furthermore, section 4F now contains specific requirements which must be fulfilled before an offer or sale by a
registered dealer becomes exempt.63 °
Section 5 of the Illinois Securities Law which provides for the
registration of securities, 63' requires that registration by either co618. Id.
619. Id.
620. Id. at paras. 137.2-17 (b),(c),(d),(e).
621. Id.
622. Id. at para. 137.3.
623. Id.
624. Id.
625. Id. Previously, section 3C exempted securities "issued by and representing an
interest in a debt of, or guaranteed by, any United States bank, savings institution, or
trust company." Id.
626. Id. at para. 137.3.
627. Id.
628. Id. at para. 137.4.
629. Id.
630. Id.
631. Id. at para. 137.5.
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ordination or qualification be completed prior to the offer or sale of
securities in Illinois.632 Accordingly, section 5A sets forth the process of registration by coordination. Registration by qualification is
detailed further in section 5B. 633 New provisions in section 5C involve oversales of securities.634
Sections 5E, 5F, and 5G also have been significantly amended. 635
Section 5E requires that renewal of registration 636 be performed by
an issuer, controlling person, or registered dealer if an application
for renewal is filed with the Secretary of State.637 The renewal may
be for the amount of securities remaining unsold under the preceding registration.6 38 In addition, applications must be accompanied
by a renewal fee.639
Section 5F requires the applicant or registrant to notify the Secretary of State in writing within two business days after the receipt
"of any stop order, denial, order to show cause, suspension or revocation order, injunction or restraining order, or similar order entered or issued by any state, federal or other regulatory authority
or by any court" 64 affecting securities which are registered or will
be registered in Illinois. 64" Finally, section 5G states that documents filed or fees paid under section 5 are deemed filed or paid,
respectively, on the date of their receipt by the Secretary of
6 42
State.
Section 6, as amended, provides for registration of face amount
certificate contracts. 643 Face amount certificate contracts must be
registered either by coordination or by qualification. 6' Section 6A
outlines registration of face amount certificate contracts by coordination" 5 and registration by qualification is set forth in section

6B. 646

As amended, section 7 of the Illinois Securities Law of 1953 per632.
633.
634.
635.
636.
637.
638.
639.
640.
641.
642.
643.
644.
645.
646.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at para. 137.6.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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tains to registration of investment fund shares. 64 7 Again, registration of investment fund shares must be accomplished by either
coordination or qualification. 648 The procedures for both methods
of registration are detailed in Sections 7A and 7B respectively. 649
Section 7 also provides for renewal of registration for investment
fund shares in a manner similar to that provided in section 5.650
Furthermore, section 8 states that, except as otherwise provided
within the Act, dealers, salespersons and investment advisers must
be registered with the Secretary of State. 651

This registration re-

quirement, however, does not apply when such a person offers or
sells securities in a transaction "believed in good faith to be exempted by [subsections] ...of [Section] 4. "652 Moreover, the registration section requires that salespersons of dealers, issuers, or
controlling persons 653 pass an examination conducted by the Secretary of State.654 Other provisions of the section articulate conditions which operate to deny, suspend, or revoke registration. 655

Advertising is considered in section 9. 616 Pursuant to section 9,
the Secretary of State may require the filing of certain advertising
communications which have been or will be disseminated to prospective investors.657 Other specifically enumerated types of advertisement can never fall within the registration requirement, and
consequently do not require registration.658
Section 10 delineates service of process procedures.659 Section 11
creates the duties and powers of the Secretary of State.6 " The fees
provisions contained in section 11A have been changed significantly.66 ' Other important changes have occurred with respect to
the sentence for any person who violates the section 12 definition
of violation.662 These new sentencing provisions are contained in
647.
648.
649.
650.
651.
652.
653.
654.
655.
656.
657.
658.
659.
660.
661.
662.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at para. 137.7.

at para. 137.8.

at para. 137.9.

at
at
at
at

para.
para.
para.
para.

137.10.
137.11.
137.11a.
137.12.
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Section 14.663
In section 15, evidentiary matters are discussed. 664 The scope of
section 15 now extends to administrative, civil, and criminal actions. 665 Furthermore, section 15a has been added to permit the
issuance of non-binding statements by the Secretary of State.666
These statements generally concern the applicability of the Illinois
Securities Law of 1953 to any transaction or proposed transaction.667 Finally, section 16 operates as a savings clause.66 s
D.

Banks and Banking Legislation

Recently, the Illinois General Assembly passed a new Public
Act affecting banks and banking.669 Its provisions became effective
July 1, 1986.670 This act, now codified, amends the Illinois Bank
Holding Company Act of 1957 (the "Act"). 671 The amendments
have been instituted to provide "a unified and orderly method of
permitting limited interstate banking on a regional basis".672 Consequently, the amended Act is significantly different from the original one.673
In section 2, important terms relied upon throughout the
amended act are defined. Four significant changes appear in the
definitional section. 674 First, the definition of "banking office" generally includes a bank's main office, a bank facility, or any bank
office where deposits are accepted. 675 This definition, however,
does not extend to automatic tellers or offices outside of the United
663. Id. at para. 137.14.
664. Id. at para. 137.15.
665. Id.
666. Id. at para. 137.15a.
667. Id.
668. Id. at para. 137.16.
669. 1985 Ill. Laws 84-1036. The provisions of Public Act 84-1036 relating to bank
holding companies were renumbered by Public Act 84-1123, which was signed by Governor Thompson on June 30, 1986. All citations regarding bank holding companies are to
Public Act 84-1123 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, paras. 2502-2512 (Supp. 1986)).
670. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17 paras. 2502, 2505, 2508, 2509, 2509.01, 2510, 2510.01.04, 2510.1, 2512 (Supp. 1986); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, paras. 501-505; ch. 26, para. 4213 (1985).
671. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17 paras. 2502, 2505, 2508, 2509, 2509.01, 2510, 2510.01.04, 2510.1, 2512 (Supp. 1986); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, paras. 501-505; ch. 26, para. 4213 (1985).
672. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 2512 (Supp. 1986).
673. Id. at paras. 2502, 2505, 2508, 2509, 2509.01, 2510, 2510.01-.04, 2510.1, 2512
(Supp. 1986).
674. Id. at para. 2502.
675. Id. at para. 2502(c).
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States.676 Second, section 2 defines "principal place of business" as
the state location of the bank office holding the bank's largest total
deposits.677 With respect to bank holding companies, the principal
place of business is "the state in which the total deposits held by all
of the banking offices of all of the bank subsidiaries of such bank
holding company are the largest. ' 678 Third, section 2 defines "Illinois Bank" as any bank which is organized under Illinois or federal
law and whose principal place of business is in Illinois. 679 Fourth,
pursuant to the amended act, any bank which is not an "Illinois
is a "Midwestern
Bank" but whose principal place of' 68business
0
State" constitutes a "Midwest Bank.
Other definitional changes in section 2 indicate how a bank holding company qualifies as an "Illinois Bank Holding Company." A
bank holding company qualifies if its principal place of business is
in Illinois 6s and the company is not controlled by another bank
holding company whose principal place of business is not in Illinois.*686 82 Furthermore, "Midwest Bank Holding Company" means
any bank holding company which does not qualify as an "Illinois
Bank Holding Company" but has its principal place of business in
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, Missouri, or Wisconsin. 61 3 Additionally, a "Midwest Bank Holding Company" may
not be controlled by another bank holding company which does
not have its principal place of business in one of the aforementioned midwestern states. 684 Finally, the Act defines "foreign
bank" and sets forth the method for identifying the "home state"
of a foreign bank.685
Section 3.02 specifies actions considered unlawful under the
Act.686 The most significant change in this section concerns acquisitions of Illinois banks by other Illinois bank holding companies
or by Midwest bank holding companies.687 Essentially, the
amended Act requires that any bank holding company, Illinois or
Midwest, acquiring an Illinois bank have a minimum total capital
676.
677.
678.
679.
680.
681.
682.
683.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at para. 2502(c)(1).
at para. 2502(r).
at
at
at
at
at

para.
para.
para.
para.
para.

2502(l),
2502(o).
2502(m)(1).
2502(m)(2).
2502(g).

684. Id. at para. 2502(p).
685.
686.
687.

Id. at para. 2502(j)(k).
Id. at para. 2505.
See Given, supra note 672, at 535.
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of seven percent of its total assets.68 8 The capital requirement is
enforced before the transaction and after its completion.689
Other noteworthy amendments to the Bank Holding Company
Act affect section 3.07's provision for control and voting shares.69 °
Section 3.07 now operates to restrict non-Illinois bank holding
companies from controlling or owning more than five percent of
the voting shares of an Illinois bank. 6 1 The section prohibits such
control or ownership unless the prospective controller/owner conforms with section 2 of the Act, registers before December 31, 1981
with the Federal Reserve Board as a bank holding company, and
either controls at least two Illinois banks,6 9 2 or qualifies under
other provisions set forth in the Act.693
The other provisions referred to in section 3.07 create six conditions which, if fulfilled, permit a Midwest bank holding company
to acquire an Illinois bank or Illinois bank holding company.6 9 4
First, the laws of the state of the Midwest bank holding company
must not be "unduly restrictive when compared to those imposed
by the laws of Illinois. '695 Accordingly, the Commission of Banks
and Trust Companies examines the restrictions upon powers or
privileges of Illinois bank holding companies under the laws of the
Midwestern state.696 The Act states that the Commissioner will
not approve the application of any Midwest bank holding company
unless the laws of the Midwestern state would permit "an Illinois
bank holding company to acquire the Midwest bank holding company seeking to make the proposed acquisition. ' 697 Further, the
laws of the Midwestern state also must permit an identical acquisition by an Illinois bank holding company. For example, if the target Illinois bank or bank holding company were located in the
Midwestern state, the laws of the Midwestern state would have to
698
allow an Illinois bank holding company to acquire it.
Second, pursuant to section 3.07, an applicant must furnish information indicating that the acquisition would promote the safety
688.
689.
690.
691.
692.
693.
694.
695.
696.
697.
698.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 2505(a)(7) (Supp. 1986).

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at para. 2510.01(a).
at para. 2509.01.
at para. 2510.
at para. 2510.01(a)(1).

at para. 2501.01(a)(1).
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and soundness of the institution to be acquired.699 Moreover, the
Commissioner must be satisfied that "the banks already controlled
by the applicant adequately meet the convenience and needs of the
communities served by them in accordance with the Federal Community Reinvestment Act of 1977" (the "C.R.A."). 700 Information also must substantiate that the Illinois bank or bank holding
company will be operated in compliance with the C.R.A. after the
acquisition.70 1 Finally, fulfillment of the second condition requires
the applicant to demonstrate
"how the transaction will bring net
70 2
new benefits to Illinois.
Third, in permitting a Midwest bank holding company to acquire Illinois banks or Illinois bank holding companies, the Commissioner must, under certain circumstances, impose limitations.7 3
The new act directs the Illinois Commissioner to "make the acquisition subject to any conditions, restrictions or other limitations
that would be applicable to acquisitions by Illinois bank holding
companies in the other state but' 7 would
not be applicable to intra4
state transactions in that state. 0
The fourth precondition for acquisition mandates that the Commissioner approve an acquisition by written order within sixty days
of submission of a completed application.7 5 Similarly, if the Commissioner disapproves an application, he must substantiate the disapproval in a written ruling.70 6 Furthermore, under the amended
Illinois act, the Commissioner imposes and collects application fees
which are based upon the cost of processing the application.7 7
The fifth provision of section 3.07 allows the Commissioner to
"enter into cooperative and reciprocal agreements with the bank
regulatory authorities of any Midwestern state. ' 7 ' The permitted
agreements facilitate periodic examination of bank holding companies. 70 9 Accordingly, pursuant to the agreements, the Commissioner "may accept reports of examination and other reports from
699. Id. at para. 2510.01(a)(2)(A).
700. Id. at para. 2510.01(a)(2)(B).
701. Id. at para. 2510(a)(2)(C). See Given, supra note 672, at 537-38.
702. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 2510.01(a)(2)(D) (Supp. 1986).
703. Id. at para. 2510.01(e).
704. Id.
705. Id. at para. 2510.01(f)(2)(A). If the Commissioner decides to hold a public
hearing, the decision must be rendered within 30 days of the hearing. Id. at para.
2510.01(f)(2)(B).
706. Id.
707. Id. at para. 2510.01(f).
708. Id. at para. 2510.02.
709. Id.
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[the out-of-state] authorities in lieu of conducting his own
examinations." 710
The final provision of section 3.07 determines the consequences
for an unlawful acquisition of an Illinois bank or Illinois bank
holding company.7 1 The amended Illinois act indicates that if an
acquisition prohibited by section 3.07 transpires, the Commissioner must order the entity making the acquisition "to divest itself
immediately of its ... ownership or control of [the] Illinois bank or

Illinois bank holding company. "712
In addition to the aforementioned amendments to the Illinois
Bank Holding Company Act of 1957, the amended act instituted
changes in other Illinois banking laws.7 13 These additional amend-

ments are pro-consumer in nature. 1 Pursuant to the amendments, Illinois banks and savings and loans must "provide a
disclosure statement for each consumer-deposit account it offers.

' 7 15

Moreover, the amended act directs every Illinois bank or

savings and loan to offer a Basic Checking Account to any person
over the age of sixty-five who so requests. 71 6 Furthermore, an
amendment establishes that every bank and savings and loan must
file a Community Reinvestment Act Statement and make it available for public inspection. 7 7 Finally, a significant change in section 4-213 of the U.C.C. requires banks and savings and loans "to
fulfill specific check clearing periods for customers who have had
accounts with the bank or savings and loan for at least ninety
18
days.

7

IX.

CONCLUSION

During the Survey year, the Illinois Supreme Court and the Illinois appellate courts refined numerous principles of commercial
law. Furthermore, the Survey year produced significant commercial legislation.
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713.
714.
715.
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Id.
Id. at para. 2510.01(g).
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Id. See also Given, supra note 672, at 541.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, paras. 501-505 (1985).
Id. at para. 503.
Id. at para. 504.
Id. at para. 505.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, para. 4-213 (1985). See Given, supra note 672, at 542.

